






Litigation and Embedded Legality: 
A communicative model of polycentric evolution for business and 









Candidate Number: 80022 
Advisors: Cecilia Bailliet and Inger-Johanne Sand 






  I 
ABSTRACT: 
 
Maturation of the business and human rights discourse has been arrested by a protracted 
stalemate over the question of legality.  Whether or not an international legal regime is desirable 
for the regulation of business and human rights, its development is exceptionally unlikely in the 
foreseeable future.  The central argument of this work is that there remains, however, a 
formative role to be played by legal reasoning, legal concepts and legal institutions in the 
development of polycentric and hybrid regulatory systems.  This claim is demonstrated by 
constructing a communicative model of transnational human rights litigation against 
corporations.  Two communicative functions of litigation are explored.  Firstly, it is argued that 
by articulating normative standards, courts lend clarity and authority to complex norms, and 
reference to that authority by other discursive actors embeds the legal framing of norms in the 
constitutive rules regulatory systems.  Secondly, by iterating network links, litigation promotes 
strategic and communicative connections between actors, fora for normative contest, and 
regulatory mechanisms, linking the business and human rights discourse up with legal apparati 
and imposing distinct challenges to the legal profession.  Together, by framing norms and 
expanding networks, litigation embeds legality in a discourse actively engaged in the 
construction of regulatory arrangements.  Embedded legality does not determine the content of 
regulation, but courts have institutional and procedural advantages as fora for arguing about 
content.   While embedding legality does not equate regulatory systems with legal regimes, it 
does satisfy the compliance criteria of several legal theorists, thereby transcending the 
dichotomy of voluntarism vs legal sanctions.  The model concludes by suggesting that litigation 
ought to be promoted not only as a mechanism for punishing ‘determined laggards’ but more 
importantly for its long term influence on the way in which norms and identities within the 
business and human rights discourse are approached, understood and enacted.  This strategy is 
especially imperative for the human rights movement, which has not yet managed to adapt 
coherently or effectively to the challenges posed by a global market. 
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 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Aims and Clarifications 
1.1.1 The Research Question  
 Transnational human rights litigation against corporations in domestic courts is 
generally regarded in academic literature as anomalous and epiphenomenal, one of many 
diverse regulatory mechanisms operating in a complementary, but independent manner 
across the local, national and international registers.  A broad mass of research explores the 
statutory basis and doctrinal developments of such litigation, and a polemic debate rages 
over its ability to deter and restitute corporate malfeasance, yet virtually no attention has 
been paid to ways in which litigatory practices might interact with a larger regulatory 
context.  The analysis seeks to breach that lacuna by asking: 
 
‘What kind of long term effects, if any, do instances of human rights litigation 
against transnational corporations in domestic courts, either singularly or 
cumulatively, have on the international regulatory context of business and human 
rights?’ 
 
This entails a number of complementary, but ancillary questions regarding the nature and 
dynamics of that regulatory context, which actors and institutions are relevant and why, and 
what conditions promote regulatory coordination and efficacy.   
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 1.1.2 Theory, Methodology and Outline of the Argument 
 In what follows, I will construct a ‘communicative model’ of regulatory system 
development in the business and human rights discourse.  This model is novel for its 
theoretical amalgamations, which merit a brief description.     
 This analysis takes research on polycentric governance as its starting point, to which 
an ‘interactive theory of networks’ is applied, resulting in a discourse theoretic and 
constructivist understanding of the regulatory context.  The analytical progression is thus a 
three step metonymic sequence, transmutating the unit of analysis from various actors 
engaged in transnational ‘governance’, to nodes in networks, to communicative platforms 
within a discourse.  The resulting focus on interactive processes and social facts fits 
comfortably within a social constructivist research agenda, and has many affinities with the 
work of legal process scholars.1
 
A methodological challenge inherent in analyzing the conditions under which 
polycentric regulatory systems might be constructed for global business and human rights, 
is the invariable need to describe that which does not yet exist.  This necessitates analogical 
theorizing, which turns here to the field of environmental regulation.  Though 
environmental law is also without a global system for regulating corporate behavior, there 
exists a rich body of literature on polycentrism, examining both ‘place-based’ regulatory 
systems, and arrangements in the context of European Union integration.  Analogical 
argumentation is, moreover, supported by the close affinity of the two paradigms.  Human 
rights litigation often serves as a proxy for addressing environmental wrongs,2 and the 
                                                 
1           Relevant approaches are surveyed in Slaughter, Anne Marie & Raustiala, Kal, "International Law, 
International Relations and Compliance," in Carlsnaes, et al. (eds.), Handbook of International Relations. 
(London: Sage, 2002), including the New Haven school and Yale’s ‘world constitutive process’ model.  On 
constructivism, see Finnemore, Martha & Sikkink, Kathryn, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research 
Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics" 4 Annual Review of Political Science 391 
(2001) and Ruggie, John Gerard, Constructing the World Polity : Essays on International Institutionalization 
(London: Routledge, 1998), pp 1-41. 
2 Litigation over “human rights violations arising out of the Bhopal gas Disaster in India ” is a well 
known example, In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (1986), at  844.  See also 
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 quintessentially transnational character of environmental issues—both the indifference of 
environmental problems to cultural geography and the novel forms of cooperation their 
regulation necessitates—provides a useful model for imagining developments in 
transnational human rights regulation.3   
 
 After presenting the essential actors and arguments of the business and human 
rights debate in chapter 1, chapters 2 and 3 construct the communicative model.  Chapters 4 
and 5 explore the communicative functions and consequences of litigation within that 
model, and chapters 6 and 7 propose conclusions.   
 The argument may be seen to consist of two movements.  The construction of the 
communicative model suggests novel perspectives on litigation in the business and human 
rights discourse.  The examination of litigatory functions in that model suggests a role for 
legal language and processes in non-legal regulation, which may be thought an alternative 
means of transcending “the tired dogma of ‘voluntary versus mandatory’”4 currently 
dominating the business and human rights debate.   
1.1.3 Terminology 
 One of the central tenets of this model is that rudimentary terms such as business 
and human rights are not statically and universally defined, but that their meanings are 
subjected to constant contextual processes of negotiation and construction, much as 
“insofar as the overall global context itself is in transition, standards do not simply ‘exist’ 
out there, waiting to be recorded and implemented, but are in the process of being socially 
                                                                                                                                                    
Acevedo, Mariana T., "Intersection of Human Rights and Environmental Protection in the European Court of 
Human Rights" 8 New York University Environmental Law Journal 437 (1999-2000). 
3             Drahos and Braithwaite note that the environmental movement is the “best resourced and most 
organized” globalized social movement (Braithwaite, John & Drahos, Peter, Global Business Regulation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p 499), while Alston argued as early as 1991 that the human 
rights movement has much to learn from environmental regulation, especially in regard to issue integration 
(Alston, Philip, Human Rights and Environmental Rights: Are They Compatible? 1991, p 31). 
4  Ward, Halina, Legal Issues in Corporate Citizenship, Swedish Partnership for Global Responsibility 
(2003) , p 35. 
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 constructed.”5  Such terms are accordingly here employed in their broadest of senses.  
Transnational is generally used to refer to dynamics compromising the traditional sanctity 
of national borders, while international appears in connection with political fora traditional 
dominated by states, and global denotes something approaching the universality of an 
understanding or ubiquity of phenomena.  Corporation refers to enterprises, businesses and 
firms indiscriminately.  Polycentric system follows Ostrom’s seminal formulation,6 while 
hybrid refers to structures or mechanisms that are composed of actors from, or engaged in 
regulation of, both the public and private spheres, or composed of both legal and non-legal 
elements.  This model’s understanding of terms such as network, discourse, governance, 
communication and communicative are intricately bound up in the logical progression of 
the argument, and define themselves in the course of its development.   
1.2 The Debate on Business and Human Rights 
 Globalization poses numerous challenges to a traditional understanding of human 
rights, and the political apotheosis of the transnational corporation is as widely recognized 
as it is definitive.  Accounting for approximately 70% of world trade, 25% of total global 
output, 80% of information technology trade, 90 % of private research and development,7 
some 70,000 transnational commercial enterprises and 700,000 subsidiaries8 lattice the 
global in a vast and nebulous series of networks.  Penetrating and transcending the 
                                                 
5  These processes are, in the final analysis, coterminous.  Ruggie, John, Interim Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational  Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises, United Nations Commission on Human Rights (2005), par 54. 
6        Ostrom, Vincent , et al. "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: a Theoretical 
Inquiry" 55 American Political Science Review 831 (2001), p 831. 
7 Robertson, Robbie, The Three Waves of Globalization: a History of a Developing Global 
Consciousness (London: Zed Books, 2003), p 198 
8  See http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=6087&intItemID=3489& 
lang=1&mode=toc , and Ruggie, cites the same at supra note 5, par. 10-12. 
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 institutional, territorial and national boundaries of states, the transnational corporation 
exerts considerable influence on the day to day lives of individuals all over the world, even 
while emerging as a determinative force in the conduct of international politics.9  This has 
provoked a number of theories for classifying human rights ‘violations’ by corporations,10 
and deriving their human rights obligations at international law as either a reflection of 
actor capacity,11 or compelled by globalized market forces.12   These analyses often entail 
regulatory prescriptions for either an international treaty13 or cooperation between the 
world’s most prominent international institutions,14 but have made little headway in 
international policy circles.     
 A variety of novel regulatory mechanisms have also emerged, often of a private 
character, and the proliferation of corporate codes of conduct, private standards and 
certification schemes, shareholder initiatives and ethical investment portfolios, all attuned 
                                                 
9  On this latter point, see Bull, Benedicte, et al., "Private Sector Influence in the Multilateral System: 
A Changing Structure of World Governance?" 10 Global Governance 18 (2004). 
10  See Jungk, Margaret, Business Responsibility for Human Rights Abroad, Danish Center for Human 
Rights, Confederation of Danish Industries, and the Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries (2005) 
available at <http://www.humanrightsbusiness.org/020_project_publications.htm>; as well as Frey, Barbara 
A.,  "The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Companies in the Protection of International 
Human Rights" 6 Minnesota Journal on Global Trade 153 (1997), pp 180-7.   
11  Ratner, Steven R., "Corporations and Human Rights: a Theory of Legal Responsibility" 111 The 
Yale law journal 104 (2001). 
12  Greathead, Scott "The Multinational and the "New Stakeholder": Examining the Business Case for 
Human Rights" 35 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational law 719 (2002); Ward, Halina "Securing 
Transnational Corporate Accountability through National Courts: Implications and Policy Options" 24 
Hastings international and comparative law review 24 (2001) at 453  
13 Ratner, supra note 11; Meeran, Richard, Corporations, Human Rights and Transnational Litigation, a 
lecture held for the Monash University Law Cambers, 29 January 2003 (2003); and Koh, Harold Hongju 
"Separating Myth from Reality about Corporate Responsibility Litigation" 7 Journal of International 
Economic Law 263 (2004). 
14  Kinley, David & Tadaki, Junko, "From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law" 44 Virginia journal of international law 94 (2004); 
Deva, Surya "Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and International Law: Where From 
Here?" 19 Connecticut journal of international law 58 (2003). 
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 to the human rights related performance of transnational business, has loomed large in the 
protracted debate over whether the regulation of business and human rights ought to be 
voluntary or binding.  Many commentators note the complementarity of the two 
approaches, and Steinhardt has gone so far as to describe a “rough coherence” between 
[f]our separate but compatible regimes” of market based regulation, domestic regulation, 
civil liability in domestic courts, and international regulation, as a “new lex mercatoria.”15  
 The debate remains largely partisan, however, with much of the business 
community firmly opposed to binding solutions, and much of the activist community ardent 
in their endeavor to move “beyond voluntarism.”16  At the international register, this 
standoff came to a head with UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms).17  
Embraced by much of the activist community as a candidate for development into 
international hard law,18 business rejected the very idea of ‘norms’, preferring human rights 
sensitive ‘operational frameworks’.19   The Norms themselves were ambiguous about their 
own legal status and potential,20 and in 2005 John Ruggie was appointed Special 
                                                 
15  Steinhardt, Ralph, "Corporate Social Responsibility and the International Law of Human Rights: the 
New Lex Mercatoria," in Alston (ed.), Non-state Actors and Human Rights. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), pp 178 & 179. 
16  See Beyond Voluntarism: Human Rights and the Developing International Legal Obligations of 
Companies, International Council on Human Rights Policy (2002).  
17           UN DocE/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003). 
18  Kinely describes the Norms as “essentially a draft treaty.” Redmond’s rendition of the argument is 
informed and concise (Redmond, Paul, "Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights: Options for Standard 
Setting and Compliance" 37 The International Lawyer 34 (2003)). Vagts, on the other hand, sees the norms as 
“of marginal utility” (Vagts, Detlev F. "The UN Norms for Transnational Corporations" 16 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 8 (2003), p 795). 
19  See e.g., Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights on the sectoral 
consultation entitled "Human Rights and the Extractive Industry", held 10-11 November 2005, OHCHR 
(2005) . 
20  This was in fact their most contentious aspect.  See Vagts, supra note 18; Weissbrodt, David & 
Kruger, Muria "Current Developments: Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
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 Representative to the Secretary General on Business and Human Rights (SRSG) with a 
mandate to clarify their constitutive elements and legality in an effort to build consensus.21   
The SRSG’s interim report of March 2006, however, dismissed the norms as “a 
distraction,”22 foiling hopes that they might serve as a draft treaty or, at the very least, 
represent consensus on standards.23
1.3 The Puzzle Piece of Litigation  
 At the intersection of legal polemics and innovative activism lies transnational civil 
litigation against corporations in domestic courts for human rights malfeasance abroad.  
Developed primarily under the US Alien Tort Statute (ATS),24 and with only a scattering 
of cases in commonwealth and civil law jurisdictions,25 the appropriateness and efficacy of 
such litigation remain contentious.  Praised by advocates as the only effective enforcement 
mechanism, litigation is widely applauded for its benefit to human rights victims and 
                                                                                                                                                    
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights" 97 The American Journal of International Law 22 
(2003); and Ruggie, supra note 5, on the Norms’ “doctrinal excesses” at par’s 59-60. 
21  Information relating to the appointment and mandate of the SRSG is available at http://www.reports-
and-materials.org/UN-Special-Representative-public-materials.htm. 
22  Ruggie, supra note 5, p 69. 
23 For a collection of civil society responses (mostly indignant) to the interim report, and SRSG 
responses to those responses, see the Business and Human Rights Website Section: http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Gettingstarted/UNSpecialRepresentative.  
24 The Alien Tort Statute grants US federal courts “original jurisdiction for a tort only committed in violation 
of the law of nations.”  (28 U.S.C. § 1350). 
25  For the suggestion that such litigation is distinctly American, see Stephens, Beth, "Translating 
Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies For International Human 
Rights Violations" 27 The Yale Journal of International Law 58 (2002), for the contrary position and a 
discussion of the international prospects for such litigation, see Chpt.7.1, supra.   
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 survivors,26 and deterrent effect on corporate behavior.27  These benefits are not clear, 
however.  Restitution has been fraught with practical problems28 and it is difficult to 
determine what kind of ripple-effect it has had on corporate behavior.29  The tendency of 
litigation to end in settlement precludes precedence, and some commentators have argued 
that it discourages proactive rights promotion by corporations,30 who are quick to decry 
litigation’s negative consequences for trade and foreign policy.31   
 A tremendous mass of academic literature addresses the doctrinal development and 
historical foundation of human rights litigation.  Analyses exploring its consequences or 
interaction with broader social contexts, meanwhile, are few, including Koh’s transnational 
                                                 
26  van Schaack, Beth, "With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human Rights Litigation as a Tool for Social 
Change" 57 Vanderbilt Law Review 46 (2004) at footnote 49. 
27  “We are going to spend the next couple of years suing every company we can find that is engaged in 
human rights violations,’ declares Terry Collingsworth of the international Labor Rights Fund [and council in 
Doe vs. Unocal Corp]. ‘And in the long run, we are going to get help from the investment community.  When 
we win just one case, the companies are going to have to add this to their evaluation criteria. We then won’t 
have to police this anymore. The investors will.” Cited in: SustainAbility, The Changing Landscape of 
Liability; a Director's Guide to Trends in Corporate Environmental, Social and Economic Liability, a report 
produced by SustainAbility (2004), p27. 
28  Parker, Clive, Wrangle Prolongs Allocation of Unocal Payout, Irwaddady, 17 Aug 2005 available at 
http://www.burmanet.org/news/2005/08/17/irrawaddy-wrangle-prolongs-allocation-of-unocal-payout-clive-
parker/.  
29  See Thames, H. Knox "The Effectiveness of US Litigation against MNCs in Burma" 9 Human 
Rights Defender 6 (2000). 
30  “In fact, ATCA cases force MNCs into a strategy of  downplaying their ability to have a substantial 
impact upon their immediate social and physical environment, thereby implying a sort of diminished capacity 
to act responsibly in a proactive way,” Shamir, Ronen, "Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims 
Act: On the Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility" 38 Law & Society Review 635 (2004), p 
649. 
31  See Markels, Alex, Myanmar-Unocal Case Could Affect Global Trade, New York Times News 
Service, 15 June 2003 available at 
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/bizfocus/archives/2003/06/15/2003055364>; Amicus Brief in Support of 
Certiorari. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, International Chamber of Commerce (2004); and USA Engage web site 
at http://www.usaengage.org/MBR0088-USAEngage/default/priority%20issues/ats.htm.  
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 legal process,32 Van Schaack’s continuum between “direct client advocacy” and “public 
impact models” of litigation33 and Stephan’s “expressive judicial function.”34   But these 
analyses all circumscribe the social effects of litigation with national boundaries.  Scott and 
Wai have moved one step further, suggesting a potential for human rights norms to 
‘migrate’ in litigation, and thus ‘destabilize’ legal doctrines, and potentially provoking 
dynamics of transnational change.35  The analysis is constrained to narrating isolated 
incidents, however, and while theoretically compelling, no interactive pattern emerges.  
Elsewhere, Wai suggests an “ideational function” for human rights litigation as “inter alia, 
a mechanism for shining light upon private conduct, convincing third parties to join a 
boycott, or publicizing state interaction,”36 but does not expand, leaving the point stranded 
at a level of abstraction shared by Teitel’s broad and unsubstantiated assertions that “the 
constructive work of human rights litigation is inextricably bound up in the construction of 
the meaning of global rule of law.”37   
 By failing to explore how litigation interacts with the larger regulatory context of 
business and human rights, these analyses also fail to challenge the dominant trope of 
human rights litigation as the isolated, independent and anomalous piece of a larger 
regulatory puzzle—a novel curiosity, perhaps of punitive, deterrent, or restitutive utility.   
                                                 
32  See Koh, Harold Hongju, "Transnational Legal Process" 75 Nebraska law review 181 (1996). 
33  Supra note 25 at 2309. 
34  Stephan, Paul B., "A Becoming Modesty: U S Litigation in the Mirror of International Law" 52 De 
Paul Law Review 627 (2002), p 629. 
35  Scott, Craig & Wai, Robert, "Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct through the Migration 
of Human Rights Norms: the potential contribution of transnational 'private' litigation," in Joerges, et al. 
(eds.), Transnational  Governance and Constitutionalism. (Oxford: Hart, 2004). 
36  Wai, Robert, "Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society" 46 
Harvard International Law Journal 471 (2005), p 482. 




2 Network Governance and Cooperation 
2.1 Networking the Global Public Domain   
Economic globalization has produced elaborate regulatory arrangements that often 
blur traditional distinctions between public and private actors,38 legal and non-legal 
sources,39 the law and market practice.40  The broad rubric of ‘governance’ denotes a 
                                                 
38  Alston noted early on that “…impacts of TNCs on a host state’s actions are increased with the 
privatization of public goods generally, as the ability of government to promote and protect human rights, 
even if protected by a constitution and enforced by an independent judiciary, then becomes more restricted.”  
Alston, Philip, "Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization" 8 European Journal 
of International Law 435 (1997); while Claire Cutler argues that “firms are basically behaving like 
governments,” (cited in Ruggie, John, "Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues, Actors, and 
Practices" 10 European Journal of International Relations 490 (2004), p 503); and Picciotto notes that this 
blurring is especially true for intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations operating at the 
international register, where many organizations, “although private associations, perform quasi-public 
regulatory functions” (Picciotto, Sol, "Introduction," in Picciotto & Mayne (eds.), Regulating International 
Business (Basingstoke: Palmgrave, 1999)p 10). 
39 Meidinger’s pithy articulation of the problematique’s categorical bottom line is worth quoting: “…by 
developing standards which they claim further public goals, non-governmental bodies inevitably subject 
themselves to expanded legal requirements, regardless of whether they are fully equated to government 
bodies.” (Meidinger, Errol, "Law and Constitutionalism in the Mirror of Non-Governmental Standards: 
Comments on Harm Schepel," in Joerges, et al. (ed.), Transnational  Governance and Constitutionalism. 
(Oxford: Hart, 2004), p 195.   
40  Most notorious is perhaps lex mercatoria.  Hailed by some as ‘global law without a state’, others 
dismiss such legal aspirations as  “dangerous…undesirable…and ill-founded,”(see Teubner, Gunther, "Global 
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 variety of literature occupied with how these phenomena lead to cooperative strategies for 
the production, distribution and guaranty of public goods.  Implicit in this literature is the 
understanding that novel governance arrangements are intimately related to the powerful 
rise of private actors on the global stage, and a considerable amount of ink is spilt on 
identifying who exactly those relevant actors are and what they are doing.  Haas provides a 
succinct first blush: 
 
A lot of governance is clearly already going on, the trick is…a clearer map of the 
actual division of labor between governments, NGOs, the private sector, scientific 
networks and international institutions in the performance of various functions of 
governance.41    
 
 Ruggie has argued that the debate, production and delivery of public goods takes 
place in a transnational arena he styles the “new global public domain,” whose most 
relevant actors include transnational corporations, financial institutions, civil society 
organizations, faith-based movements, private military contractors and “such illicit entities 
as transnational terrorist and criminal networks.”42  Advocates of binding regulation tend 
meanwhile to focus on corporate behemoths and international organizations, while others 
stress the importance of business consortia and learning fora.43  An immediate observation 
is that which actors are relevant depends considerably on both the type of governance under 
observation and the normative strategy of the analysis.   
                                                                                                                                                    
Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World-Society," in Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a State. (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1997), citing Mann at p 7).  Steinhardt offers a middle ground, noting that  “in the synergistic 
dynamic that was the [classic] lex mercatoria, practices affected rules which affected practices which refined 
rules, and so on, over centuries.” (Steinhardt, supra note 15 at 225). 
41  Haas, Peter M., "Addressing the Global Governance Deficit" 4 Global Environmental Politics 1 
(2004), p 8.  The ‘functions’ include: agenda setting, framing, monitoring, verification, rule making, norm 
development, enforcement, capacity building, and financing, p 6.  
42  Supra note 37, at 509-10. 
43  Ruggie has long championed the learning forum model exemplified by the Global Compact, which, 
despite its relevance, cannot be treated here. 
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 A second observation is that actors are most relevant not in isolation, but 
interaction.  ‘Who’s who’ is almost ontologically accompanied by ‘who does what’ in 
governance structures, and the most pertinent question is perhaps how they cooperate.  This 
introduces the centrality of network connections common both to governance and global 
business structures.44
Human rights advocacy has proven adept in exploiting this commonality through 
nodal interventions,45 as well as the use of network formations.46  Of particular interest is 
the way in which “civil society acts as a ‘transmission belt’ between deliberative processes 
within international organizations and an emerging transnational public sphere.”47  In such 
instances civil society participates in governance, and the potential for cooperative activity 
in the provision of public goods by diverse sectors lends network governance a value added 
greater than the sum of its parts.  Such networks 
 
combine the voluntary energy and legitimacy of the civil society sector with the 
financial muscle and interest of businesses and the enforcement and rule-making 
                                                 
44  On how the former confounds traditional legal regulation, see Teubner, Gunther, Coincidentia 
Oppositorium: Hybrid Networks Beyond Contract and Organization, Storrs Lectures 2003/4: Yale Law 
School (2003-4), http://www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/ifawz1/teubner/Publika/PublikaEngl/. 
45  Emblematic is the “coalition of more than 600 organizations in 70 countries [which] sprang into 
‘virtual existence’ on the World Wide Web almost overnight to oppose [and eventually defeat] the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment.” (Ruggie, supra note 37, at 511). 
46  This is true in litigation, as will be explored below.  For the efficacy of networks in influencing state 
compliance with human rights norms, see Risse, Thomas, et al. (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), offering six case 
studies. 
47  Nanz, Patrizia, "Legitimation of Transnational Governance Regimes: Foodstuff Regulation at the 
WTO: Comments on Alexia Herwig," in Joerges, et al. (eds.), Transnational  Governance and 
Constitutionalism. (Oxford: Hart, 2004), p 230. 
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 power and coordination and capacity-building skills of states and international 
organizations.48
 
 A second important characteristic is the inherent flexibility of network organization.  
Ruggie notes that transnational corporations have “have gone global and function in near 
real time, leaving behind the slower moving state-mediated inter-national world of arm’s 
length economic transactions,”49 and they have been accompanied by a host of other 
actors.50  Network governance structures thus tend to 
 
operate through broad, open-ended, and often informal, yet surprisingly durable 
commitments by diverse sets of actors to address complex problems jointly by 
means of ongoing multi-party collaboration…emphasizing continuous generation of 
new information which leads in turn to continuous adjustment, refinement, and 
reconfiguration of both goals and policy measures, as well as the underlying 
institutional arrangements themselves, in light of new learning and changing 
conditions.51
 
This fluidity and informality, while certainly contributing to fact that “networks are protean 
things, difficult to define or typologize,”52 appears key to their efficacy in the governance 
                                                 
48  Reinkicke, Wolfgang H. & Deng, Francis M., Critical Choices: The United Nations, Networks, and 
the Future of Global Governance, UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks (2000) 
<www.globalpublicpolicy.net>, p 24. 
49  Supra note 37, at 503, emphasis in original. 
50  See Teubner, supra note 43. 
51  Karkkainen, Bradley C., "Post-Sovereign Environmental Governance" 4 Global Environmental 
Politics 72 (2004), p 74-5. 
52  Reinkicke & Deng, supra note 47 at viii. 
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 context.53  In their study of polycentric environmental regulation in the Western Balkans, 
Antypas et al note that 
 
informal networks are arguably more important than the formal institutions as it is 
the former that drive the formation of the latter and provide both opportunities and 
limits to their development and reach. Transboundary Policy Networks…and the 
institutions they have created…reflect a gradually emerging transnational public 
policy-making structure in the region that is the product of a complex interplay of 
people and organizations characterized by heterogeneous policy.54  
 
This is a concrete example of how the network organization of actors engaged in 
governance leads to durable cooperative structures and produces a polycentric regulatory 
system at the micro (placed-based) register.  Granting the assumption that polycentric 
systems for the regulation of business and human rights will develop according to 
comparable dynamics, this mandates a closer look at how cooperation is built and sustained 
between disparate actors. 
                                                 
53  For the complications this poses to grass roots advocacy, see McDonald, Kevin "From Solidarity to 
Fluidarity: social movements beyond 'collective identity': the case of globalization conflicts" 1 Social 
Movement Studies 109 (2002). 
54  “…by ‘policy networks’ we mean informally composed linkages of politicians, civil servants, policy 
analysts, experts, non-governmental organizations and interest groups and so on, that provide the informal 
institutional forums in which public policy options are debated, negotiated and decided upon.” Antypas, 
Alexios & Avramoski, Oliver, "Polycentric Environmental Governance: Towards Stability and Sustainable 
Development" 34 Environmental Policy and Law 87 (2004), p 12. 
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 2.2 Coordination and Systematicity 
Polycentric regulatory mechanisms are products of coordination per definition. 
Introducing the concept of a “polycentric political system” in their seminal article of 1961, 
Ostrom et al note that: 
 
‘Polycentric’ connotes many centers of decision-making which are formally 
independent of each other.  Whether they actually function independently, or 
instead constitute an interdependent system of relations, is an empirical question in 
particular cases.  To the extent that they take each other into account in competitive 
relationships, enter into various contractual and cooperative undertakings or have 
recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflicts, the various political 
jurisdictions in a metropolitan area may function in a coherent manner with 
consistent and predictable patterns of interacting behavior.  To the extent that this is 
so, they may be said to function as a ‘system.’55
 
Extant polycentric governance arrangements tend to entail coordination between relatively 
few actors and institutions with complementary mandates and specializations.  This is 
especially true of ‘place-based’ environmental regulation, where focus on a specific and 
preexisting problem organizes the coordination of diverse actors according to shared 
principles and understandings ex ante.  Research on polycentric governance clearly 
attributes this to the scope of interaction. 
 
Ostrom…has been at great pains to specify the conditions under which iterative 
processes of institution building can lead to the appearance of effective governance 
systems. These include: actors in the network should recognize their 
interdependence; they should know each other for years; there should be a relatively 
                                                 
55  Ostrom, supra note 6. 
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 small number of actors who trust one another. If these conditions are fulfilled, than 
cooperation can develop.56
 
 This corresponds well to ‘place-based’ systems, and colors cooperative 
developments at the international register, where actors, preferences and strategies are 
grossly multiplied, as much less likely.  Schout and Jordan refer to the regional integration 
of environmental policy as “a multi-actor, multi-level problem par excellence.”57   
 To imagine polycentric governance structures for business and human rights at the 
global level is to imagine rather grand network structures linking states, international and 
non-governmental organizations, business leaders and consortia, market and faith based 
initiatives.  It is tempting to read nascent traces of such structures into the “roughly 
coherent” regimes described by Steinhardt.58  But complementarities do not constitute 
governance systems.  As Falkner notes, 
 
governance needs to be distinguished from mere cooperation between private 
actors. Cooperation requires the adjustment of individual behavior to achieve 
mutually beneficial objectives, and… is mostly of an ad hoc nature with a short 
lifetime. Governance, however, emerges out of a context of interaction that is 
institutionalized and of a more permanent nature. In a system of governance, 
individual actors do not constantly decide to be bound by the institutional norms 
based on a calculation of their interest, but adjust their behavior out of recognition 
of the legitimacy of the governance system. Cooperation may lead to governance, 
                                                 
56  Schout, Adrian & Jordan, Andrew, "Coordinated European Governance: Self-Organizing or 
Centrally Steered?" 83 Public Administration 201 (2005),  pp 9-10, referencing Ostrom, Elinor, Governing 
the commons : the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), pp 197-206. 
57  Ibid, p 18, emphasis in original. 
58  Supra at note 15. 
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 but more is required than the spontaneous convergence of private actors’ interests 
via the coordinating function of markets.59
 
Were such systematicity possible for the global regulation of business and human rights, 
the resulting “interdependent system of relations” would be more in line with the kind of 
regime envisioned by Trubek for the transnational regulation of labor relations: 
 
In lieu of simplistic models that rely on the restoration of a pure national autonomy 
or utopian dreams of sweeping global regulation some have begun to explore 
prospects to strengthen and supplement national norms through a multilayered 
approach [of] a mosaic of normative orders and norms that would, taken together, 
establish a multilevel public-private, cascading transnational regime…60
 
 Neither the potential form, content nor structure of transnational regulatory systems 
are here at issue, but rather the conditions for any kind of global systematicity.  Assuming 
the hard-case of self-directed and autonomous organization, this analysis will propose 
modes of cooperative development for place-paced and autonomous regulatory 
mechanisms, themselves often transnational, and ways in which they might cohere and 
expand to achieve global reach.  
 While the activity of networks in the global public domain is essential to 
understanding these conditions, it is important from the beginning to make a semantic 
distinction between “the network as an analytical tool, which aims to map the topological 
structures of the social relationships, and the network as a form of governance…one with 
its own logic.”61    I am here using a network methodology to determine the necessary 
                                                 
59  Falkner, Robert, "Private Environmental Governance and International Relations: Exploring the 
Links" 3 Global Environmental Politics 72 (2003), p72-3. 
60  Trubek, David M., et al., "Transnationalism in the Regulation of Labour Relations: International 
Regimes and Transnational Advocacy Networks" 25 Law & Social Inquiry 28 (2000), p 1189. 
61 Dicken, Peter, et al., "Chains and Networks, Territories and Scales: Towards a Relational Framework 
for Analyzing the Global Economy" 1 Global Networks 89 (2001), p 92. 
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 conditions of network governance, but the two concepts are as distinct as the literature from 
which they emerge.  To avoid equivocation I will below refer to the latter as polycentric 
systems.  The main thrust of this chapter has been to set the stage for the development of 
such systems in the ‘global public domain’, and to posit the centrality and contours of 
cooperative network structures thereby. 
2.3 The Social Construction of Cooperative Structures 
Ronen Shamir has described corporate social responsibility, not as a movement or 
doctrine, but as a ‘discursive field’, where the very meaning of corporate responsibility 
“must be constructed and articulated through various symbolic means,”62 and 
“regulatory/disciplinary regimes are pursued and negotiated among a host of players.”63  
This complements Ruggie’s understanding of the global public domain as “the arena in 
which expectations regarding legitimate social purposes, including the respective roles of 
different social sectors and actors, are articulated, contested, and take shape as social 
facts.”64  Together these two frameworks go a long way towards delineating what this 
analysis refers to as the business and human rights discourse.  The picture is completed by 
applying the logic of networks and the most salient characteristics of network structures in 
a discourse are naturally interactive.   
Networks “are relational because they are constituted by the interactions of 
variously powerful social actors.  These relationships can exist in the form of rules, 
conventions, values, regulations and so on,” and this implies that networks are “both social 
structures and ongoing processes, which are constituted, transformed and reproduced 
                                                 
62  Shamir, Ronen, "Mind the Gap: The Commodification of Corporate Social Responsibility" 28 
Symbolic Interaction 229 (2005), p 230. 
63  Supra note 29, at 659. 
64  Supra note 37, at 504. 
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 through asymmetrical and evolving power relations…”65  These power relations strike 
recurrent patterns, and bring together  
 
as allies or adversaries, a multitude of actors who occupy a variety of strategic 
positions…that coalesce around certain specific understandings (and vested 
interests in pursuing certain understandings)66   
 
 Discursive networks are manifest by positioning strategic constellations of nodes, 
and this is in itself a jockeying for power, as the strategic meaning of each position is a 
function of all other positions.  The organization, indeed the very identification, 
comprehension and mobilization of strategic positions in discursive negotiation and 
contest, is effected by communication between actors and fora.  This observation has two 
important theoretical consequences.  Firstly, a communicative focus allows greater 
analytical room for the study of norms, which are the discursive currency of business and 
human rights.  It also prompts a critical rethinking of what social facts lurk beneath the 
murky surface of cooperative governance. 
 
The global public domain may fall seriously short of Falkner’s strict governance 
criteria: an institutionalized “context of interaction” and behavior modification based on the 
“recognition of the legitimacy of the governance system.”67  But it is worth looking closely 
at the case with which Ruggie exemplifies his argument 
Ruggie’s narrates a chain of reactions to the Bush administration’s rejection of the 
Kyoto Protocol, and the litany entails a motley mix of actors and efforts—corporate 
lobbyists, business leaders promoting ‘enlightened self interest’, activist boycotts, 
shareholder resolutions and lawsuits, projects initiated by private philanthropic funds, 
pronouncements by corporate insurers, ‘son-of-Kyoto bills’ enacted by state legislators, 
and an ethical investment summit held by a coalition of public pension managers, the UN 
                                                 
65  Dicken, supra note 60 at 94 and 104. 
66  Shamir, supra note 29, at 648. 
67  Supra note 58, at 73, but see Ruggie, supra note 37 at 519. 
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 and Harvard University.  Ruggie concludes, “[n]o central mechanism coordinates these 
actions, but they do play out in an interconnected manner within and across different social 
sectors and in domestic as well as transnational arenas.”68   
 While this dynamic does not constitute an “interdependent system of relations”69 its 
‘interconnected manner’ approaches coordination, and I would argue that this is precisely 
because there was a ‘central mechanism’, though not institutionalized: the Kyoto Protocol.  
The Protocol provided a normative interpretive framework that functioned as sounding 
board for individual actions, and thereby effected indirect communication among 
institutionally independent actors and fora.  While this coordination was not 
institutionalized, neither was it ad hoc or purely self interested.  As a governing set of 
understandings that guide independent action, it greatly resembles what network theory 
terms “macroculture,” which enables “coordination among autonomous parties [by] 
creating ‘convergence of expectations’70
 A sturdier example may be development discourse and policy during the 1980s-90s.  
This discourse was then ruled by the ‘neo-liberal consensus’, the content of which, despite 
numerous legal articulations, was not ‘codified’ in any single document binding on all 
polycentric regulatory mechanism and institutions.  Shared understandings nevertheless 
engendered ‘systemic’ coherence among institutions and initiatives.  Thus without 
prohibiting actions, the consensus established a normative framework against which all acts 
and actors were interpreted, and their discursive pedigree telegraphed.   
This understanding of interactional coordination and inter-referential contexts 
recalls the concept of ‘constitutive rules.’  In Searle’s classic formulation: 
 
Some rules regulate antecedently existing forms of behavior. For example, the rules 
of polite table behavior regulate eating, but eating exists independently of these 
rules. Some rules…create the possibility of or define that activity. The activity of 
                                                 
68  Supra note 37 at 521. 
69  Ostrom, supra note 6. 
70   Jones, Candace, et al., "A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social 
Mechanisms" 22 The Academy of Management review 35 (1997), p 929. 
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 playing chess is constituted by action in accordance with these rules. The 
institutions of marriage, money, and promising are like the institutions of baseball 
and chess in that they are systems of such constitutive rules or conventions.71  
 
 Polycentric regulation represents a complicated kind of two-level game in which 
coordination is discursively organized according to constitutive rules, resulting in a system 
that articulates, applies and enforces regulatory rules.  As a ‘context for interaction’ 
discursive constitutive rules are located in the shared understandings and expectations of 
actors, amorphous and resistant to precise articulation.  Yet they are articulated, not only 
for the dissemination by which they achieve their constitutive function, but are embedded 
in regulatory rules, which perform their (collective) articulation.  This is because rule 
making and rule articulation are among the activities coordinated by the ‘macroculture’ of 
constitutive rules.  It is only against a broad normative and interpretive context that 
regulatory rules have any meaning at all.  ‘No dogs on the train’ need not parenthetically 
distinguish between seeing eye dogs, drug sniffing dogs at a border, etc., as long as rule 
makers and rule followers share a set of understandings and expectations.  In the current 
context, the rule to exclude “companies from the investment universe that produce, either 
themselves or through entities under their control, strategic components for…chemical 
weapons…”72 only makes sense if there exist shared understandings about what entities 
and control actually mean.  Reference might be made to a more constitutive rule, such as 
the rule that  
 
                                                 
71  Searle, John R., Speech Acts : an Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969), p 131. 
72  Ethical Guidelines for the Norwegian State Petroleum Fund, see 
http://odin.dep.no/fin/engelsk/aktuelt/pressem/006071-070397/index-dok000-b-n-a.html.  
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 [m]ultinational enterprises include enterprises, whether they are of public, mixed or 
private ownership, which own or control production, distribution, services or other 
facilities outside the country in which they are based…73
 
Yet even this rule relies on shared understandings, and will have effect only to the extent 
that they are weaved into a relatively stable and communal interpretive screen.  Thus, while 
defying precise articulation, constitutive rules are deducible from regulatory rules, 
behavior, and the structural and relational characteristics of the networks about which they 
coalesce. Fuller’s distinction between ‘made rules’ and ‘implicit rules’ provides an 
illustrative comparison: 
 
Made rules are…conceived prior to and projected onto conduct…implicit rules 
arise from conduct, not conception. Verbal formulations may more or less 
accurately capture the rules implicit in the conduct, but the formulations are always 
post hoc and strictly answerable to the conduct. No formulation is authoritative in 
virtue of its public articulation alone….Although implicit rules arise from the 
conduct of determinate agents, typically they have no precise date of birth and no 
determinate authors…Thus, implicit rules arise from and draw their practical force 
from the interdependence of expectations and aims...   
 
Enacted norms make sense…only when they are set in the context of concrete 
practices, attitudes, and forms of social interaction.74  
 
While it may not be possible to locate a moment of inception for constitutive rules, this 
chapter has aimed to identify the structural conditions under which they may be manifest or 
                                                 
73  Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy. 
GB.204/4/2 (1977), par 6. 
74  As described by Postema, Gerald J. "Implicit Law" 13 Law and Philosophy 361 (1994), pp 363-4, 
375-6; internal citations omitted. 
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 constructed.  For the business and human rights discourse, this leads to the following 
propositions: 
 Following dismissal of the UN Norms polycentric regulatory systems may be the 
only viable mode for the global regulation of business and human rights, but are predicated 
on coordination and cooperation between network actors.  Understanding the global public 
domain as a discourse casts cooperation in the role of constitutive rules, the structural 
conditions of which are shared understandings and expectations.  The business and human 
rights discourse is rife with active contest, negotiation and construction of shared 
understandings, but the broad dissemination and consensus that would endow them with 
constitutive status remains a distant hypothetical, a possibility crippled by ‘the tired dogma 
of voluntary vs. mandatory’.   Against the background of this understanding, the following 
chapter will approach a mechanical examination of the strategic contests and negotiations 




3 The Business and Human Rights Discourse 
3.1 Communicative Platforms and Norm Relay 
Interactive network theory provides the basic mechanisms for understanding 
communicative interaction in the business and human rights discourse, suggesting that 
 
the global economy is constituted by ‘spaces of network relations’.  Individuals, 
households, firms, industries, states, unions or other organizations and institutions 
can represent social actors in the global economy.  We then need to understand the 
intentions and motives of these social actors and the emergent power in their 
network relationships.  These relationships are embedded in particular spaces… 
[which] can include localized spaces (for example financial districts in global cities) 
and inter-urban spaces (for example webs of financial institutions and the business 
media that bind together global cities).  The global economy is thus made up of 
social actors engaged in relational networks within a variety of ‘spaces’.  The 
analytical lens we adopt can thus vary widely.  It may be geographical, it may be 
sectoral, and it may be organizational.  It may be some combination of these.75
 
The analytical lens here adopted would understand such ‘spaces’ as institutionalized spaces 
of discursive action, within which actors contest and negotiate ‘specific understandings’ 
about the very rules of the game.   
                                                 
75  Dicken, supra note 60 at 97. 
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  These discursive spaces occupy an analytical register quite distinct from the 
strategic topography against which networks and actors position themselves for negotiation 
and contest over specific understandings.   Strategic discursive positions at that register are 
only meaningful in paradigmatic comparison to all other positions, and organization is an 
interactive process of recognition and alignment that relies on communication within and 
between networks.  Communicative platforms provide the fora at which this takes place—
where proclamations, incitations, accusations, denials, admonishments, diatribes and 
didactics allow discursive actors to recognize the strategic landscape of discourse and 
position themselves within it, in order to further their own grounded and ideological 
interests.   
 Communications themselves are inevitably normative, launched from 
communicative fora and into the fray of discursive struggle, they compete with other 
normative communications, and together comprise the jumbled field of norm-war that is 
the business and human rights discourse.  Some norms are resilient and reappear 
consistently in the discourse, while others die a quick death, and communicative platforms 
serve two determinate functions in this regard.   
 Firstly, they are the discourse’s gatekeepers.  Regardless of how germane a norm, it 
will not gain discursive recognition and currency unless emanating from a sanctioned 
platform.  Because it is only through communicative platforms that actors engage discourse 
structures and effect the realignment of strategic positions, the success of any given norm 
in contest is discernable to the extent that it is subsequently communicated in other fora.   
 Secondly, and closely related, communicative platforms posses mutable, but 
perceptible authority, and this seems have a decisive effect on how well communications 
fare in normative contest.  Thus, a norm regulating parent company responsibilities in 
regard to unions at independent bottling plants will be more resilient in norm contest when 
communicated from the platform of the World Bank Presidency than by someone 
interviewed at a ‘Kill Coke’ rally.  This is not a ‘one-off’ phenomenon, however.  The 
norm, if successful, will be subsequently communicated in another forum, and perhaps 
again, and again, at which point it will retain the authority of the World Bank presidency 
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 (however affected by the authority of subsequent communications).  This implies that the 
authority of communicative platforms is embedded within the norm itself.76  
 This is most recognizable as an appeal to authority—public relations statements cite 
an independent audit, shareholder initiatives cite an NGO report—but it is important to 
note that it is never the authority of the norm per se that is appealed to, but the authority of 
a communicative platform.   This distinction is especially clear in common law legal 
argumentation, which necessitates reference to communications occurring within fora of a 
specific legitimacy—rather than norms of a specific legitimacy.  The norm proclaiming a 
general ‘right to property’ is thus a substantially, politically and discursively different norm 
today than it way when communicated by John Locke in 1690.  This is not only because 
social contexts have changed, but because that norm is now embedded with a vast recession 
of communications in philosophical treaties, international instruments, cold war 
propaganda and judicial and legislative specifications at the local register.  These prior 
communications are embedded within the norm, and such baggage exerts a determinative 
influence on how norms are asserted, rejected and admitted.  This dynamic is differentiated 
from an ordinary understanding of norms by referring to ‘complex norms’.77  
 
The authority embedded in complex norms is self-reinforcing in a manner similar to 
rules: 
 
Every time agents choose to follow a rule, they change it - they strengthen the rule - 
by making it more likely that they and others will follow the rule in the future. 
                                                 
76  This corresponds with Dicken et al’s  description of a “mutually constitutive process” whereby 
contexts, or territories, are embedded in  network structures and vice-versa, ibid at 96-7. 
77  A standard constructivist understanding of norms as “shared expectations about appropriate behavior 
held by a community of actors,” notes the inter-subjective aspect of norms as well as their intimate 
connection with action, without capturing this dynamic (Finnemore, Martha & Dessler, David, "National 
Interests in International Society" 103 The American Journal of Sociology 2 (1997), p 22). 
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 Every time agents choose not to follow a rule, they change the rule by weakening it, 
and in so doing they may well contribute to the constitution of some new rule.78
 
Substitute rule adherence with norm communication and this is a pithy description 
of how norms are relayed from one communicative platform in the business and human 
rights discourse to another.  In addition to strengthening the authority and resilience of 
complex norms, norm relay also strengthens the pathways between communicative fora.  
Repeated relay among communicative platforms strengthens the network connections 
between those fora and participants active in them.79  The way in which these two 
tendencies are manifest and influenced by the characteristics of each individual 
communicative platform, may be discussed in terms of that platform’s articulative and 
iterative functions.   
The self reinforcing nature of embedded authority and relay pathways can play a 
key role in the foundation of constitutive rules by facilitating wider dissemination of 
norms, understandings and interpretations of social context, and promoting repetitive 
communication between fora.  As articulated by network theory: 
 
The more structurally embedded (e.g., the more connected and frequently 
interacting) the industry participants, the more widely they share their values 
assumptions, and role understandings. 
 
Since structural embeddedness diffuses information throughout a system, it also 
facilitates the development of macroculture—the common values, norms and 
beliefs shared across firms—because parties share perceptions and 
understandings…80
                                                 
78  Onuf, Nicholas, "The Constitution of International Society" 5 European Journal of International 
Law 1 (1994), p 18. 
79 In network theory, “frequent interactions establish the conditions for relational and structural 
embeddedness,” Jones, supra note 69 at 917. 
80  Ibid at 926, 930. 
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 The pattern that emerges from these observations is a discursive constellation of 
communicative platforms from which diverse actors can mobilize normative 
communications for general contest.  Complex norms trace paths between fora, 
strengthening network ties and becoming more resilient in norm competition through relay.  
Excessively reinforced norms and interactive network connections facilitate the 
development of shared social realities, here termed constitutive rules.   
3.2 The Privileged Discursive Fora of Courts 
Of the diverse communicative platforms within the global public domain, the 
institutional forum provided by transnational litigation in domestic courts is unique, 
privileged both strategically and functionally.   
The institutional placement of transnational litigation offers a strategic advantage to 
discursive actors, acknowledged only implicitly by literature on norm entrepreneurship and 
transnational advocacy networks, often responsible for initiating human rights litigation.81  
Transnational advocacy networks exercise “soft power” on the “global norm structure”82 
from a variety of communicative platforms, including “relatively dull reports, lively street 
protests, [and] private meetings, but in all cases the stress is on changing discourses and 
practices.”83  While the effects of such communications merit real consideration, they tend 
                                                 
81 See e.g., Koh, supra note 31; Lutz, Ellen & Sikkink, Kathryn, "The Justice Cascade: the Evolution 
and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America" 2 Chicago Journal of International Law 1 
(2001); and van Schaack, supra note 25.  For the seminal work on advocacy networks see Keck, Margaret E. 
& Sikkink, Kathryn, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1998). 
82  Boli, John, "Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms 
Edited by Sanjeev Khagram, James V Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2002 366p" 1 Perspectives on Politics 2 (2003), at 301. 
83  Ibid at 305-6. 
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 to exhibit an inverse relationship between sound argumentative rationality and 
communicative force.  As Dine wryly notes, 
 
It is difficult to carry a protest banner reading ‘It might be a good idea to sequence 
trade and capital account liberalization for small economies so that domestic 
industries and the financial sector are protected from the worst of the “herd” 
behavior of the international financial sector’—but simplistic ‘wrecking’ answers 
such as ‘Ban the WTO’ or ‘Kill Coke’ are unlikely to achieve justice in the trading 
system.84   
 
 The institutional forum provided by courts transcends this strategic double bind by 
combining the authority inherent in judicial decisions with the fact that “courts are 
unusually well positioned to enunciate norms, because of both their independence and their 
willingness to engage in dialogue over legal meaning.”85  Courts are also strategically 
attractive for actors politically outmatched in other communicative fora.  The presumption 
of equality before the law formally obviates power imbalances between corporations and 
individuals, and while serious power imbalances remain, and access even to courts of 
exorbitant jurisdiction remains fraught with procedural and practical obstacles, the 
successful initiation of litigatory procedures represents unprecedented access for the 
subaltern to communicative processes within the ‘global norm structure.’ 
 
Functionally, the communicative platform provided by litigation is also distinct in 
that its operation is predicated upon explicit contest between specific norms.  While most 
communicative fora produce complex norms that then engage in a larger, abstract and 
poorly understood normative contest in the greater discourse, litigation institutionalizes 
specific procedures for the competition between specific complex norms and groups of 
                                                 
84  Dine, Janet, Companies, International Trade and Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), ix-x. 
85  Koh, supra note 31 at 2397. 
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 norms.  This institutionalizes what Thomas Risse would call “argumentative logic”, and 
structurally privileges the platform’s ability to impact constitutive rules.   
Risse et al distinguish the instrumental rationality of bargaining, whereby ideas are 
used instrumentally to achieve strategic ends, from argumentative rationality, whereby both 
sides accept one another as valid interlocutors, accept common premises of debate, and 
submit themselves to external authority.86  In proposing “arguing and communicative 
action as significant tools for non-hierarchical steering modes in global governance,”87  
Risse notes that “speakers in a court room must submit to the logic of arguing in order to be 
able to make their case.  Thus, the institutional context and setting of a court guarantees 
that the triadic nature of arguing can operate.”88  This is especially relevant when 
considering the courtroom as a platform engaged in discursive negotiations over the 
content of constitutive rules.  Risse cites empirical research suggesting that argumentative 
rationality plays a critical role in the agenda-setting phase of negotiations, determining the 
manner in which issues are ‘framed’, and thus understood, contested and enacted in 
subsequent discourse.89    
 
The strategic and functional advantages of courts per se apply to civil cases in 
domestic courts a fortiori, and even if international courts were given personal jurisdiction 
over legal persons, domestic courts, and civil litigation in particular, have a distinct 
relevance for the regulation of transnational corporate enterprises.  Robert Wai suggests 
that though globalization may have led to the “lift-off” of international business from state-
based regulation, “transnational private law in national courts may be able to leverage its 
role as a necessary touchdown point.”90   
                                                 
86  Supra note 45 at 250-256, discussing movement from the former to the latter as “rhetorical 
entrapment.”  
87  Risse, Thomas, "Global Governance and Communicative Action" 39 Government and Opposition 
288 (2004), p 288. 
88  Ibid at 300; ‘triadic argumentation’ entails submission to external authority, a third party. 
89  Ibid, especially at 302; see also Payne, Rodger A., "Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction" 7 
European Journal of International Relations 25 (2001), pp 37-61. 
90  Wai, supra note 35 at 478. 
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Although transnational business and financial actors have become much more 
mobile (and clearly more mobile that labor), most businesses still ‘put down roots.’  
National courts are still one of the locations at which international transactions and 
the international economy must ‘touch down’ to achieve certain benefits.91
 
This is both a strategic and a functional distinction, and provides a good illustration of 
transnational litigation’s unique position in the discourse, operating as a nexus for 
interactive power relationships between states, corporations and individuals, while 
imposing strict discursive conditions on the norm contest it entertains.  The following two 
chapters will examine the way in which these distinctions are manifest in the articulative 
and iterative functions performed by transnational human rights litigation.  This chapter has 
been occupied with establishing the business and human rights discourse as a constellation 
of discursive platforms from which complex norms are communicated, embedded with the 
context and authority of their communication, to compete in relay from one platform to 
another.   
                                                 
91  Wai, R. "Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private 
International Law in an Era of Globalization" 40 The Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 209-274 
(2002), p 265. 
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4 The Articulation of Norms  
4.1 Complicity in the Constitutive Rule 
The closest one might come to a constitutive rule for the business and human rights 
discourse may be to say that business should not be complicit in human rights abuses.  Of 
course, wide agreement on the rule’s propriety is predicated on its ambiguity—consensus 
runs no deeper.  As discursive factions align themselves in the struggle over what precisely 
it is that human rights have to do with business, friction, and then conflict, erupts and at the 
terms and conditions upon which rules are built.  Debate over the meaning, nature and 
scope of complicity is ardent and widespread.   
Legal definitions of complicity differ significantly across jurisdictions, and though 
the Rome Statute and international Tribunals have done much to clarify international 
criminal standards, this has only analogous bearing on corporate complicity.92  Such 
distinctions tend anyway to be effaced by concepts such as ‘silent’ or ‘beneficial’ 
complicity, which have no legal pedigree, but carry considerable political weight.   This 
lack of clarity is exacerbated by a highly partisan debate—roughly coterminous with the 
voluntary/binding dichotomy—as complicity is regarded by much of the human rights 
movement as the key means of establishing corporate accountability, and much of the 
business community sees the concept as one “that will be used to hunt multinationals as a 
                                                 
92  Clapham, Andrew, "The Question of Jurisdiction Under  International Criminal Law over Legal 
Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court," in Zia-Zarifi & Kamminga 
(eds.), Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000). 
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 kind of anti-neo-liberal blood sport.”93  Academic treatments tend to take a more balanced 
and comprehensive approach,94 but the lack of an authoritative standard has spawned much 
discussion.95  National courts have also entered the fray, and the most authoritative 
articulation to date has come from the US 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Doe v Unocal.96
 
In 1996 class action lawsuits were filed alleging that Unocal Corporation had been 
complicit in human rights violations committed against Burmese villagers during the 
construction of the Yadana oil pipeline in Burma (now Myanmar).97  The violations, 
including forced labor, forced relocation, extra-judicial executions, torture and rape, were 
allegedly committed by the Myanmar military while providing security for the project.  The 
9th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a District Court finding that Unocal’s activities did not 
constitute the ‘proximate cause’ necessary to incur liability,98 finding jurisprudence from 
the International Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia particularly 
                                                 
93  Taylor, Mark, Corporate Fallout Detectors and Fifth Amendment Capitalists: Corporate Complicity 
in Human Rights Abuse: Keynote Address to the UN Global Compact Learning Forum 2003. 
94  See especially, Ramasastry, Anita, "Corporate Complicity from Nuremburg to Rangoon: an 
Examination of Forced Labor Cases and their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations" 20 
Berkeley journal of international law 91 (2002); Clapham, Andrew & Jerbi, Scott "Categories of Corporate 
Complicity in Human Rights Abuses" 24 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 12 (2001). 
95  Corporate complicity was recently the focus of the International Business and Human Rights 
Seminar held in London on Dec 18, 2005, an International Commission of Jurists Expert Legal Panel (see 
http://www.icj.org/) and will be the focus of an upcoming international conference hosted by the Ethical 
Council for the Norwegian State Petroleum Fund.  Corporate complicity also featured prominently in the 
SRSG’s interim report, supra note 5, as well as UN consultations (supra note 19), and the work of  civil 
society (see, for example http://www.amnestyusa.org/business/index.do) and business consortia (supra note 
30). 
96  John Doe I  v  Unocal Corp., 395 F. 3rd 932 (2002). 
97  For an overview, see Rosencranz, Amin  & Louk, David, "Doe v Unocal: Holding Corporations 
Liable for Human Rights Abuses on their Watch" 8 Chapman Law Review 135 (2005). 
98  Jon Doe I et. al & Jon Roe III et. al. v Unocal Corp. et al, Order on Motion of Summary Judgment, 
110 F. Supp. 2d. 1294 (2000),  Section 4,  “Plaintiffs present no evidence that Unocal ‘controlled’ the 
Myanmar military's decision to the commit the alleged tortious acts.”    
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 instructive.99  Endorsing an ‘aiding and abetting’ standard of complicity, the 9th Circuit 
determined that: 
 
Firstly, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Unocal’s alleged conduct met 
the actus reus requirement of aiding and abetting as we define it today, i.e., practical 
assistance or encouragement which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of 
the crime…100 
 
Secondly, the mens rea requirement of aiding and abetting as we define it today, 
namely, actual or constructive (i.e., reasonable) knowledge that the accomplice’s 
actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime.  …Unocal knew 
or should reasonably have known that its conduct — including the payments and 
the instructions where to provide security and build infrastructure — would assist or 
encourage the Myanmar Military to subject Plaintiffs to forced labor.101
 
Relaxing the elements required to hold a corporation liable for complicity under the 
ATS from ‘control’, ‘active participation’ and ‘proximate cause’ to ‘substantial effect’ and 
‘knew or should have known’, would be a dramatic act of judicial will.  A settlement was 
reached prior to the en banc hearing ordered by the 9th Circuit, however, vacating the 
judgment.  Though the 9th Circuit’s reasoning thus does not set binding precedent, it 
                                                 
99  The majority drew especially from reasoning in Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95- 17/1-T, 
38 I.L.M. 317 (1998), to reject the district court’s complicity standard of ’active participation’. 
100  Unocal I,  14220 p9, 100 At 953.  Unocal executives engaged in repeated meetings with activist 
groups documenting violations, and memos where uncovered in discovery outlining denial strategies.   
101  Ibid. at 14222.  Several other liability theories are also relevant.  Judge Reinhardt’s concurring 
opinion endorsed joint venture, agency, and reckless disregard theories of liability, and the facts of the case 
also seem likely to invite a ratification theory (see Larry Bowoto, et al., v. Cheveron Texaco Corp., et al. and 
Moes 1-50, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, 312 F. Supp. 2d. 1229 (2004), for this theory’s 
application to corporate complicity in human rights violations in Nigeria).  In a parallel case, Chaney J ruled 
in favor of an agency theory of liability that required no knowledge at all (Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 
237980, BC 237 679, Not Reported (2004). 
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 remains persuasive as dicta, and represents an important point in wider relay.  A closer look 
at the way in which this complex norm has traveled will illustrate how the articulative 
function of communicative platforms is performed by domestic courts.   
4.2 Relaying the Unocal Standard 
Courts are distinct as communicative fora, firstly because they entertain the explicit 
contest of complex norms for relay, and secondly because those norms relayed into 
litigation, if relayed out in judgment, are embedded with an authority and clarity particular 
to judicial articulations.   
Legal reasoning’s reliance on a specific class of authority also has the tendency to 
fuse norms relayed from legal and non-legal platforms in res judica.  Thus, of the vast 
number of competing norms before the 9th Circuit, a norm defining forced labor as a 
preemptory norm, and articulated by the ILO, defeated the norm excusing forced labor 
when it forwards the public good, articulated by the US Supreme Court, and when relayed 
in judgment was embedded in complementary and authoritative communications, 
including judgments and international legal instruments.102   
The fusing of legal and non-legal communications within complex norms 
represents a strategic discursive advantage for norm entrepreneurs, but these dynamics 
also have the effect of accentuating and promoting relay between judicial fora in 
judgments, giving the impression of a closed circuit of relay between courts.  A closer 
look at the 9th Circuit judgment is illustrative. 
                                                 
102  Jon Doe &Jon Roe III v UnocalCorp, 110, F. Supp. 2d. 1294, at P5III,B,5, & Doe v. Unocal corp., 
963, F. Supp. 880 at 14245-6.  Digging into the embedded communications of complex norms may 
presumably proceed ad nauseum, a near infinite recession, granted only patience and a strong interpretive 
will. 
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 The 9th Circuit’s reasoning relies primarily and successively on three prior 
judgments.  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala103 established the precedence by which US courts may 
try transnational human rights cases under the ATS in the first place, Kadic v. Karadzic104 
established individual liability for certain international crimes, and Prosecutor v. 
Furundzija105 provided the specific elements of the standard.  This is not, however, best 
understood as the reference to three contained authorities by a single persuasive 
communication.  In the very first case before the ICTY, reasoning in Kadic led to the 
assertion that crimes against humanity do not require state action.106  In Furundzija the 
ICTY judges relied heavily on Filartiga to determine the nature of the international 
prohibition against torture.107  The chronological sequence of the cases is Filartiga, Kadic, 
Tadic, Furundzija, Unocal; while the persuasive sequence less linear, as represented 
below. 
 
                                                 
103  Supra note 98. 
104  Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (1995). 
105  Supra note 98. 
106 Trial Chamber II Judgment (10 Dec 1998) at par 147 
















The recurrent iteration and persuasive authority in this dynamic, transcending 
precedential and jurisdictional bounds, significantly resemble the kind of judicial 
networking described by Anne Maria Slaughter, in which judges are  
 
engaging in a growing dialogue with their counterparts around the world…through 
mutual citation and increasingly direct interaction [which suggests that they] 
contribute to a nascent global jurisprudence on particular issues…108    
 
In the terms of interactive network theory, the simultaneous recognition and 
assignation of persuasive authority in other communicative platforms strengthens network 
                                                 
108  Slaughter, Anne Marie, A New World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), p 
70. 
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 connections.  The articulative and iterative functions of complex norms are here intimately 
related, as repeated interaction between fora inevitably strengthens network connections 
thru their iteration.  As each of these relay points represents the embedding of a platform’s 
authority within subsequent communications, this also represents a strengthening of the 
norm.  Thus, despite the lack of binding precedence, the persuasive authority of the 9th 
Circuit standard has relayed to other judgments,109  and in a civil suit against the oil giant 
Talisman for complicity in genocide, Cote J. utilized the 9th Circuit’s articulation of 
aiding and abetting as the standard of corporate complicity at international law, locating 
that standard among “the core principles that form the foundation of customary 
international legal norms—principles about which there is no disagreement.”110  This 
strong claim is a direct product of relay.111   
 
This feedback loop of persuasive authority between courts has great normative 
power, and can even have the effect of ‘legalizing’ international norms, as was the case 
with the human rights prohibition against forced disappearance.  This norm was quickly 
relayed from transnational civil litigation to courts in other jurisdictions, regional human 
                                                 
109  e.g., Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401 (2002); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp, 381 F. 
Supp. 2d 1164 (2005). 
110  Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., Order and Opinion on Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Not Reported, Westlaw Slip Copy WL 2082846 (S.D.N.Y) (2005), 340-1. 
111  But not uncontested.  Cote’s dicta is not yet considered by another judge, but the Talisman ruling is 
at flagrant odds with that of Sprizzo J., who failed to even consider the 9th Circuit Unocal standard when 
rejecting the vicarious liability of multinational corporations who had supported South African Apartheid (In 
re: South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (2004)).  For a discussion of how the reasonings 
in each case diverge, and how they differently relate to the Supreme Court’s ruling on the ATS (Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 807 (2004)), see Chambers, Rachel, "The Unocal Settlement: Implications for the 
Developing Law on Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses" 13 Human Rights Brief 14 (2005) & 
Sebok, Anthony J. Unocal announces it will settle a human rights suit: What is the real story behind its 
decision? (Find Law: 2005).  The Sprizzo judgment is currently under appeal in the US 2nd Circuit.  The tone 
of proceedings and the difficulties had by plaintiff council thus far suggest that the decision, expected within 
the next months, will not look favorably on the 9th Circuit’s standard. 
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 rights courts and international human rights treaty bodies, resulting in its common 
acceptance as a part of the international legal corpus.112   
While feedback loops of persuasive authority thus represent a distinct strategy for 
international norm entrepreneurs, they are not closed circuits, and this dynamic should not 
obscure the openness of courts to relay with non-legal fora.  Litigants in transnational 
human rights cases do in fact mobilize a wide variety of norms from a wide variety of 
sources, including soft law declarations, activist publicity, neo-liberal market apologies, 
ethical treaties, expert opinions, policy drafts, business consultancy reports, socially 
responsible investment exclusion decisions, standard contracts, academic analyses and 
shareholder initiatives, and once communicated in litigation, these norms are then ‘open 
game.  Although such judgments “claim to be resolving disputes in one case only, they are 
actually declaring (or not declaring) international norms that litigants transport to other 
fora for use in political bargaining.”113   
The 9th Circuit’s liability standard has relayed widely within the communicative 
platforms of civil society,114 business consortia,115 and “multi-stakeholder initiatives” that 
connect the two116.  It has also relayed to alternative regulatory mechanisms, such as the 
disinvestment decisions of socially responsible investment funds,117 and figured 
                                                 
112  For a description of the actors and strategies, see Keck & Sikkink, supra note 80 at 102-10; for an 
overview of the relay, see Fischer-Lescano, Andreas & Teubner, Gunther "Regime-Collisions: the Vain 
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law" 25 Michigan Journal of International law 48 
(2004), at FN 170.  
113  Koh, supra note 31 at 2375. 
114  e.g., the World Social Forum  (http://www.argybargy.biz/ollie/ollie_theguardian_justice.htm) and 
Amnesty International (http://www.amnesty.org.il/data/globalize.html). 
115 Supra note 30. 
116 Supra note 94.    
117  The Talisman Judgment supported a recent successful disinvestment motion brought before 
California State Teachers Retirement System (Motion Re: Investment Policy Review – Social/Geopolitical 
Issues’, approved April 6, 2006).  For reference to litigation see background document, ‘Investment Policy 
Review – Social/Geopolitical Issues’, Item #11, June 1, 2005.  Both documents are available at 
http://www.calstrs.com/).  The 9th Circuit discussion of liability was analyzed extensively in a recent decision 
by the Council on Ethics for the government Pension Fund of Norway. (Application of the standard was used 
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 prominently in debate over potential international regulatory schemes.  Recent 
consultations held by the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) 
on the UN Norms solicited significant comment on the role of domestic courts in defining 
“what level of involvement results in complicity” and even argument that the reasoning in 
Talisman “could apply with respect to the [UN] Norms.”118  The OHCHR’s final report 
turned toward congruent opinions of domestic courts and international tribunals for 
“guidance in the further elaboration” of complicity, referring to research that cites the 9th 
Circuit standard as authoritative.119  This authority was affirmed in the SRSG’s interim 
report, which described the 9th Circuit standard as “the most explicit judicial definition of 
complicity thus far” in conformity with “what is widely thought to be the current state of 
international law on this subject.”120  This communication, emitted from what is perhaps 
the business and human rights discourse’s most authoritative platform, is enabled by relay. 
 
The point is not to establish definitive casual links between any of these 
communicative moments, nor to determine the appropriateness or final authority of any 
given standard.  The argument is rather a commonsensical assertion that norms gain 
                                                                                                                                                    
to found a decision not to disinvest from Total SA for its involvement in the Yadana pipeline, as the Fund’s 
Ethical Guidelines call for disinvestment only to prevent future human rights abuse, and the 9th Circuit 
standard was read as requiring a “direct connection” between corporate activities and the alleged abuses.  See 
discussion at footnotes 25, 27, 34, 43, 51 & 68-9, available at 
http://odin.dep.no/etikkradet/english/documents/099001-990074/dok-bn.html).  
118  Submission by the Castan Center for Human Rights, text at footnote 24.  For the full collection of 
submissions, see http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization/business/contributions.htm
119  Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights on the responsibilities of 
transnational corporations and related business enterprises with regard to human rights, OHCHR (2005) , at 
paragraph 35, citing Business and International Crimes: Assessing the Liability of Business Entities for Grave 
Violations of International Law, FAFO (2004) <http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/index.htm>: “Although these 
cases do not have precedential value outside the United States, they nevertheless deserve examination, as they 
represent relevant interpretations…The most important of [such] cases is the Unocal case…” (Executive 
Summary, pg 30).  The analysis treats the 9th Circuit’s standard both independently and in the context of 
Talisman. 
120  Ruggie, supra note 5, par72. 
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 authority through wide usage and acceptance.  Domestic courts are distinct as 
communicative fora by virtue of the clarity and authority they embed in complex norms.  
This gives norms a special resilience, especially at the international register, and can lead 
to inter-judicial dialogue and the ‘legalization of norms’.  The 9th Circuit judgment is of 
special interest, not only because it articulates a concept on which a constitutive rule will 
inevitably be built, but also for its lynchpin-style position in a wide web of relay, absent 
binding precedence.  
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5 The Iteration of Networks 
5.1 Normative Pathways between Individuals 
The seminal definition of advocacy networks distinguishes between transnational 
networks 
 
(1)…with essentially instrumental goals, especially transnational corporations and 
banks; (2) those motivated primarily by shared causal ideas, such as scientific 
groups or epistemic communities; and (3) those motivated primarily by shared 
principled ideas or values (transnational advocacy networks).121
 
 This distinction has been preserved in literature on human rights litigation, which 
notes how advocacy thrives on the expertise-sharing and publicity engine it provides.   Yet 
litigation tends to efface this distinction—lawsuits are, after all, instrumental for inducing 
causal change mandated by principles—as evidenced by the common trope of human rights 
suits as “part of a larger system of countervailing power and oversight by networks…”122  
This observation leads to a broader argument regarding the relationship between litigation 
and interactive networks, which may begin by looking at how advocacy networks emerge 
about litigation. 
 Transnational human rights litigation iterates normative pathways and novel 
network connections between actors in the global public domain by providing a nodal point 
                                                 
121  Keck and Sikkink, supra note 80 at 30, emphasis in original. 
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 about which actors create, strengthen and challenge network connections in furthering their 
own strategic ends.  The collaboration necessary to initiate and sustain a transnational 
lawsuit against a large corporation often requires varying expertise, engendering 
communication between activists, lawyers, corporate insiders and community members.  
Regular cooperation strengthens the connections binding networks, and can engender 
cooperation subsequent to litigation.123   
 Harold Koh has advocated transnational legal process as a means of explaining state 
compliance with international law. According to this model, international norms are 
internalized into state institutions and practice through a “complex process” of interaction, 
interpretation, internalization, and obedience,124 largely initiated by the articulations of 
“law-declaring fora…capable of receiving a challenge to a nation’s international conduct, 
then defining, elaborating, and testing the definition of particular norms and opining about 
their violation.”125  Though “law-declaring fora” are broadly conceived to include 
legislative bodies and UN treaty bodies, litigation is of special interest.  Among other 
notable analyses, the model traces casual lines of network advocacy from Filartiga to the 
eventual ratification of the UN Convention Against Torture by the first Bush 
administration, and the instrumentality of civil litigation and network lobbying in the UK 
for incorporation of the European Conventional of Human Rights into British law with the 
Human Rights Act of 2000.126     
But the heavy lifting of transnational legal process is conducted, not by norm 
enunciation, but rather the unnamed networks that spring up around litigation.  These 
networks are efficacious at the transnational register precisely because they extend beyond 
the pale of advocacy, moving norms from the vagaries of international norm 
                                                                                                                                                    
122  Scott & Wai, supra note 34 at 289. 
123  The perennial cooperation between activist communities involved in the Bhopal initiatives, initiating 
litigation in successive fora with alternating divisions of labor, is emblematic. 
124  Koh, Harold Hongju, "The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home" 35 Houston 
law review 623 (1998), p 644. 
125  Ibid at 650. 
126  Ibid at 664-4. 
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 entrepreneurship, through the annals of civil society and along domestic legal channels, 
until the eventual hand-off to “in-house legal experts” who enact “bureaucratic compliance 
procedures.”127  This observation is crucial.  By institutionalizing strategic coordination 
through normative pathways, litigation promotes novel network connections and 
strengthens active network connections, extending networks beyond demarcations of 
principle.   
Yet pragmatic network connections necessitated by the institutional form of 
litigation are also embedded with the normativity inherent in human rights issues, such that 
the linking up of networks to parties not prima facie invested or engaged in normative 
contest (a doctor’s office providing statistics from the site of an environmental disaster, a 
legal office responsible for drafting third party contracts or constructing subsidiary 
corporations, a county clerk or tax official) is in itself a normative act.  To say that these 
network connections are  ‘normative pathways’ is to say that anyone exposed to the process 
and facts of human rights litigation must, at some level, choose sides.  
 This supports and complicates the assertion that litigation is network-generative for 
both plaintiff and defense, a claim perhaps evidenced by the powerful rise of corporate 
lobbying consortia in direct opposition to human rights litigation.128   In any case, 
motivation-based distinctions between transnational networks appear highly arbitrary, and 
the striking paucity of literature on networks emerging about corporate counsel, while 
seeming presupposed among human rights lawyers, merits a much closer look.129  
 
                                                 
127  Ibid at 623-653. 
128  Examples include ‘CSR Watch: your eye on the anti-business movement’ 
(http://www.csrwatch.com/);  the Institute for Legal Reform (http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/) and 
‘USA Engage’ (http://www.usaengage.org/legislative/2003/alientort/). The US and International Chambers of 
Commerce filed a joint brief to the US Supreme Court in Sosa v. Machain-Alverez outlining their positions, 
(supra note 30).  For a narrative describing network links from the frontlines of litigation to lobbying efforts 
in the UN, see “Shell Leads International Business Campaign against UN Human Rights Norms”, UN 
Observer & International Report, March 15, 2004, available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/business/2004/0315norms.htm.  
129  See Lutz, supra note 80 on ‘transnational justice networks’. 
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 The quotidian difficulties inherent in gathering information for transnational human 
rights litigation are emblematic of a larger set of novel challenges posed by the 
‘globalization of law’.130  As transnational litigation establishes itself as a distinct legal 
field, this imposes a specific set of networking exigencies on and within the legal 
profession.131   The human rights community has responding to these challenges with a 
wave of publications disseminating expertise in transnational human rights litigation.132  
For corporate council, I am aware of no such didactic publications, though the exigencies 
are perhaps more acute. 
While the short-term responsibility of corporate counsel to mitigate litigation 
liabilities necessitates a certain familiarity with international law and standards, including 
soft law regimes, civil society initiatives and industry practice vis-à-vis human rights, in 
addition to the many fields of domestic law relevant to corporate social responsibility, the 
long term tasks of policy and advice work aimed towards influencing the international 
regulatory landscape demand a quite nuanced understanding of international legal 
process.133  Together, these factors make professional competence in comparative law, 
conflicts law and other dynamic fields of international law highly saleable, as “approaching 
transnational litigation in one country in disregard of these interconnections may result in 
                                                 
130  Subrin, S. N. "Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?" 52 De Paul Law Review 299 (2002). 
131  The field’s ‘arrival’ is perhaps best heralded by the publication of it’s first textbook: Steinhardt, 
Ralph G., International Civil Litigation: Cases and Materials on the Rise of Intermestic Law (Newark, NJ: 
LexisNexis, 2002).  For the long-term strategic implications this poses to practitioners and lawmakers, see 
Baumgartner, Samuel P., "Is Transnational Litigation Different?" 25 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Economic Law 98 (2004). 
132   e.g., Stephens, Beth & Green, Jennifer, An Activist's Guide: Bringing International Human Rights 
Claims in United States Courts, Center for Constitutional Law (2003) <http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/legal/docs/Activists%20Guide.pdf>; Ratner, Morris A "Factors Impacting the Selection and 
Positioning of Human Rights Class Actions in United State Courts: a Practical Overview" 58 New York 
University Annual Survey of American Law 623 (2003); Kinely, David "Lawyers, Corporations and 
International Human Lights Law" 25 The Company Lawyer 5 (2004) as well as the 102 page Human Rights 
Litigation Manual, Southern Africa Litigation Centre (2006) . 
133  See Kinely "Lawyers, Corporations and International Human Lights Law"  for an overview of the 
challenges. 
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 reactions abroad that can hamper future transnational policies in the originating country for 
quite some time.”134  The potentially infinite scope of legal expertise such a landscape begs 
can only be met by competence sharing and the interpenetration of epistemic legal 
communities—in short, the expansive iteration of legal networks for corporate counsel. 
The implications are far from certain.  It has been proposed that these developments 
will inevitably serve the interests of the human rights movement, given the demographic 
makeup of the bar135 and fact that, ‘taught law’ being ‘tough law’, “[p]rivate international 
law is continually reproduced through various forms of university-based and then 
professional education.”136  It has also been suggested that these developments are 
symptomatic of “delocalized and transnationalizing legal disciplines that both reflect and 
facilitate the transnational expansion of capitalism and related practices” in the service of a 
mercatocracy or global capitalist class.137  Whosever interests are served by these 
                                                 
134  Baumgartner, Samuel P., "Is transnational litigation different?," 25 University of Pennsylvania 
journal of international economic law (2004) 98, p 1391. 
135 Hurwitz, Deena R. "Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International Human Rights 
Clinics" 28 The Yale Journal of International Law 46 (2003). 
136  Baxi, Upendra, "Geographies of Injustice: Human Rights at the Altar of Convenience," in Scott (ed.), 
Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Human Rights Litigation. 
(Hart: Oxford, 2001), pp 200-1 
137  Cutler, A. Claire, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global 
Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p180.  ”…the mercatocracy is comprised 
of transnational merchants, private international lawyers and other professionals and their associations, 
government officials, and representatives of international organizations.  The mercatocracy operates globally 
and locally to develop new merchant laws governing international commerce and the settlement of 
international commercial disputes and to universalize the laws through the unification and harmonization of 
national commercial legal orders.”  On the threat unification efforts pose to the human rights movement as 
well as doctrinal compromises, see Dubinsky, Paul R. "Human Rights Law Meets Private Law 
Harmonization: The Coming Conflict" 30 The Yale journal of international law 108 (2005); Alston, P. 
"Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann" 13 European 
Journal of International Law 815 (2002); on the ’Transnational Capitalist Class’ see Sklair, Leslie "The 
transnational capitalist class and global politics: deconstructing the corporate-state connection" 40 Peace 
Research Abstracts (2003) 
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 tendencies in the long run, the most important dynamic for this analysis is the expansive 
and inclusive character of network iteration prompted by litigation. 
 
 
5.2 Normative Pathways between Enforcement Mechanisms 
Transnational litigation iterates normative pathways not only between individuals, 
but also between the communicative fora within which they act, as exemplified among 
courts in the previous chapter.  Such network connections are especially relevant when they 
link courts to enforcement mechanisms in the private sphere, thereby enacting hybrid 
regulatory mechanisms. 
This is especially common with suits brought not directly on human rights claims, 
as was Doe v. Unocal, but which rely on other causes of action.  A well known example is 
the false advertising suit initiated against Nike in the late 1990s.  NGO reports contested 
the veracity of Nike’s public relations campaign, which asserting that "workers who make 
NIKE products are…not subjected to corporal punishment and/or sexual abuse (sic),"138 
and a suit was then filed “on behalf of the General Public” for “false statements and/or 
material omissions of fact.”139  While the legal battle culminated in a ‘free speech’ 
question, the litigatory process spawned and strengthened a number of civil society 
initiatives.   
Litigation that relies on private initiatives for the provision of information often 
iterates network connections in a way that reinforces both communicative platforms.  
While NGO monitoring mechanisms may very well provide information on principled 
                                                 
138  Brief Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners (Nike Inc. et. al., petitioners v. Marc Kasky, 2003) 
(2003), p 2. 
139 Internal quotations omitted, Nike Inc et al, petitioners v. Marc Kasky, Dismissal of writ of certiorari, 
539 U.S. 654, 123 S.Ct. 2554 (2003), 2555.  
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 grounds, this investment can yield great returns.  Backed by compelling sanctions, 
discovery processes are capable of bringing to public record documents and other sources 
of information inaccessible, but of great value to NGOs.140  Civil society platforms 
practically strengthened by such information in terms of bargaining power, access and 
general overview.  When this same information is relayed from the civil society platforms, 
hybrid network connectivity is reinforced.141
 
Securities legislation and ‘right to know’ statutes may also support proxy litigation 
contesting the truth of corporate statements.  Civil liability clearly attaches to 
misrepresentation in financial reporting, and though company law has not traditionally 
required reporting on human rights related issues, socially responsible investors have 
litigated unflaggingly to broaden disclosure rules.142   While this has met with quite limited 
success in the US, company law reforms in the UK, France, Germany and South Africa 
increasingly mandate social and environment reporting for transnational corporate 
activity.143  The potential for litigation in light of these developments remains untested.  
  
                                                 
140  This was the case for the Unocal & Talisman cases.  Bohpal is perhaps emblematic.  See also 
‘Litigation and Information Flow’ in Wai supra note 35 a 482. 
141  This is a strategic function of actors in other fora learning how to use and navigate legal systems.  
Many NGOs capitalized on the Unocal discovery process in this way, even the ILO, see the committee report, 
Forced Labor in Myanmar (Burma): Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the 
Constitution of the International Labor Organization to examine the observance by Myanmar of the Forced 
Labor Convention 1930 (No.29), International Labor Organization (1998) . 
142  This began in the US as early as 1979, see eg: In re: Natural Resources Defence Council Inc.  v.  
SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (1979).  Broad disclosure rules have also been proposed for an international ’right to 
know regime’, see Simaika, Abdallah "The Value of Information: Alternatives to Liability in Influencing 
Corporate Behavior Overseas" 38  Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 321 (2005). 
143  For discussion of the Combined Code and LSE Listing Rules in the UK, the New Economic 
Regulations in France, the German Accounting Law Reform Act, and the South African King Report II, see 
Mares, Radu, The Incremental Institutionalisation of Corporate Social Responsibility: Synergies between the 
Practices of Leading Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights Law/Policy (Lund: Institute of Law, Lund 
University, 2006) pp 154-89. 
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 A third non-legal enforcement mechanism amenable to linking up with litigation is 
the code of conduct.  Codes of conduct may presumably be subject to the same legal 
liability for inaccuracy as false disclosure and false advertising.144   This potential is greater 
when codes are explicitly referenced in contractual arrangements, though there remains no 
consensus on their general legal status.145   Total’s website ambiguously proclaims that its 
code of conduct for activity in Burma “has legal value, since it is appended to every 
agreement signed with subcontractors working on the project and is binding on them. Its 
application is closely reviewed.”146  It is unclear what ‘legal value’ here might mean, as the 
code is perfunctory in the extreme and vague enough to make its breach a near 
impossibility.  In contrast, Novartis has recently adopted a Third Party Code outlining 
“minimum requirements all [suppliers and contractors] must meet in doing business with 
Novartis,” that is clear and specific, but without any claims to legal effect.147   
A more clear-cut example is offered by British Petroleum (BP), which has included 
the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights in its legally binding Host 
Governments Agreement for the  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project, as well as amended 
the code to its project contract with the state-owned partner in the Tangguh LNG 
                                                 
144  It is entirely uncertain what ‘kinds’ of statements regarding their activities corporations may, or 
ought to be, held to account for.  In the Unocal state case, plaintiffs cited a press release referring to “the co-
venturers’…in the Yadana Project” in support of a joint-venture liability theory for Unocal’s complicity in the 
violations.  J. Chaney found this compelling, ruling that  “While this release itself does not create a joint 
venture, it is evidence of the existence of a joint venture.” (supra note 100 at 7, lines 7-22), for an overview of 
these dynamics applied to codes of conduct in the US, see Lu, S. P. "Corporate Codes of Conduct and the 
FTC: Advancing Human Rights through Deceptive Advertising Law" 38 The Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 603 (2000). 
145  Analogously, CCBE suggests that “agreements reached through collective bargaining between 
employers and trade unions can become legally binding through incorporation in employment contracts.”  
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Role of the Legal Profession, Council of the Bars and Law Societies 
of the European Union (2003) <www.ccbe.org/doc/En/guidelines_csr_en.pdf. >.  
146  http://burma.total.com/en/gazier/p_2_1.htm
147  The code includes labor rights, non discrimination, association, and environmental practices, and is 
available at http://www.novartis.com/corporate_citizenship/en/10_2004_third_party_code.shtml.  
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 Project.148  Whatever the relative merits of these codes as enforcement mechanisms or self 
imposed legal obligations, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that their increased 
proliferation, and the increasing regularity with which they are referenced by, or appended 
to, contracts, will lend credence to the actionability of code breaches in litigation.   
Codes of conduct may also be important elements of judgment or settlement.  This 
was the case in litigation against US garment retailers for labor and human rights abuses on 
the Mariana Islands (Saipan).  The settlement, approved in April 2003, establishes a code 
of conduct for subcontracting garment production on the islands, obligating observance of 
local as well as international labor standards,149 and supplemented by a monitoring 
mechanism (“the first legally mandated independent monitoring program”).150  Whatever 
degree of sophistication or comprehension such mechanisms exhibit, hybrid iteration by 
settlement will be more durable the greater the disparity among actors interconnected.   
This may be effected through a broad civil society sampling with correspondent 
‘transmission belts’151 (e.g., the Nike settlement initiated with the Fair Labor Association, 
which is composed of NGOs involved in litigation, research, publicity…152), or a variety of 
state, private and international actors (e.g., the ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and the 
Future’ foundation, whose founding was prompted by litigation against corporations 
connected to the Nazi holocaust153).  Such pathways exhibit a strong tendency for recurrent 
relay and the dissemination of expertise.   
 
                                                 
148  See Ruggie, supra note 5, par 16. 
149 Complaints not reported, see Karet, Deborah J. "Privatizing Law on the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands: Is Litigation the Best Channel for Reforming the Garment Industry?" 48 Buffalo 
Law Review 1047 (2000). 
150  Saipan Sweatshop Lawsuit Ends with Important Gains for Workers and Lessons for Activists.  A 
copy of the monitoring program is available at 
http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/sweatshops/saipan/monitoring.html. 
151  Supra note 46. 
152  See http://www.cleanclothes.org/companies/nike00-05-04.htm & 
http://www.fairlabor.org/2004report/index.html.  
153  See Scott & Wai, supra note 34 at 305-10. 
 50 
 This chapter has illustrated how the iterative function of communicative platforms 
is performed by transnational human rights litigation.  The institution of litigation prompts 
novel network connections as strategic means, but nevertheless embedded with 
normativity, and this has the distinctive result of expanding normative networks beyond the 
pale of principled motivation.  Litigatory iteration is also distinct in the manner it promotes 
durable connections with non-legal fora.  The following chapter will explore how litigation 
‘embeds legality in discursive structures through the articulative and iterative mechanisms, 
and what effect this has on regulatory design. 
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6 Embedded Legality 
6.1 Embedding through Articulation 
Legal reasoning exerts its most immediate and formative force on concepts by 
‘framing’ them within a legal ontology.154  ‘Fisticuffs’ differ from ‘aggravated assault’ just 
as ‘killing’ differs from ‘manslaughter,’ and “[t]hinking like a lawyer is to share a 
categorical apparatus for interpreting the world in which...language too determines what 
attributes of the world are to be noticed.”155  Kratochwil has observed that this is effected 
to a great degree by argumentative premises, referred to as ‘commonplaces’ by 
contemporary studies of argumentation, and ‘topoi’ in classical rhetoric.156  Ordinary 
language topoi such as that of ‘the good Samaritan’ differ significantly from legal topoi 
such the common law ‘duty of care’,157  and while all language employs topoi to “establish 
starting points for arguments [and] locate the issues of a debate in a substantive set of 
common understandings that provide for the crucial connections within the structure of the 
                                                 
154  For a comparison with ’framing’ in Risse’s constructivist paradigm that elicits many similarities, see 
supra note 88. 
155  Kratochwil, Friedrich, Rules, Norms, and Decisions : on the Conditions of Practical and Legal 
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
p 229, internal quotations omitted. 
156  A ‘topois’, in the Greek singular, was defined by Cicero as a ‘seat of argument.’  
157  See chapter 7.2 supra. 
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 argument,”158  legal topoi represent the ontological precondition for law and legal 
reasoning as manifest by res judica. 
  
[Judicial] appraisal becomes possible only through the discursive application of 
more specialized (legal) topoi for which the laws of pleadings are a good example.  
…the enumeration of legal topoi contained in procedural rules and settled practices 
provides not only instructions as to how a practitioner is to go about a case, but also 
assurances that in the process, a case is looked at from different angles.  Finally, the 
authoritative decision which establishes the holding…depends for its 
persuasiveness largely upon a careful weaving, into one strand of thought, of legal 
and common-sense arguments.  They back the decision and its characterization of 
the case.  It is through this embeddedness of the specialized legal language in the 
practical discourse that the importance of topoi as backings or groundings becomes 
visible.159
 
 Legal topoi thus compose the infrastructure on which legal argumentation are built, 
determining to a significant degree the way in which arguments are framed.  Litigation’s 
procedural ins and outs exert a complimentary, superstructural force: “Legal arguments are, 
in addition to their rhetorical character, ‘path dependent.’ i.e., influenced by the sequence 
of pleadings and rebuttals.”160  Path dependence, moreover, resembles argumentation’s 
‘triadic nature’, and is closely linked to the perception of both clarity and authority.161
 
Through a series of “turning points,” competing interests and interpretations can be 
taken into account, and can then be either rebutted or accepted.  Thus, judicial 
decisions are path dependent, and it is this characteristic which distinguishes them 
                                                 
158  Kratochwil, supra note 154 at 219-20, quotation marks and footnotes omitted. 
159  Ibid at 228 italics, parentheses, quotation marks and footnotes omitted. 
160  Ibid at 214. 
161  Risse, supra note 86. 
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 from mere random choices, or from an unsystematic subjection of the subject-
matter to competing evaluations.162
 
The framing function of legal topoi and the ‘path dependency’ of legal 
argumentation thus operate in tandem to ontologically support legal decision-making.  The 
utilization of legal topoi in pleadings, characterizations and interpretations, serves to 
transform an ‘issue’ into a ‘case’, “hammering it into legal shape through the pleas of the 
parties and through the decisions of the pre-trial procedures.”163  The embedding of legal 
reasoning and legal process in complex norms extends this “hammering” beyond single 
judgments by endowing complex norms with clarity and authority.  Extended relay 
reinforces this dynamic, increasing the potential for influence on discursive structures and 
the foundation of constitutive rules.  If we follow Kratochwil, and view the law 
 
neither as a static system of norms nor as a set of rules which all share a some 
common characteristic such as sanctions, [but as] a choice-process characterized by 
the principled nature of the norm-use in arriving at a decision through reasoning,164  
 
then the prospect is one of embedding legality per se in the norms on which constitutive 
rules are founded, profoundly affecting the way in which regulation is performed, contested 
and understood by discursive actors at the most fundamental level. 
6.2 Embedding through Iteration 
While proliferation of regulatory mechanisms in the private sector has certainly 
contributed to an “increasingly dense regulatory environment”165 for transnational business 
                                                 
162 Kratochwil, supra note 154 at 238. 
163  Ibid at 227. 
164  Ibid at 18 
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 vis-à-vis human rights, it has not been accompanied by a unitary ‘context of interaction’ 
through which independent mechanisms might cohere.  By lending its ‘teeth’ to private and 
soft law standards and initiatives, litigation performs this function on a micro-scale, and 
these connections have the potential, if not the immediate effect of autonomous regulation, 
analogous to the polycentric ‘place-based’ systems of environmental governance.  To the 
extent that these arrangements are sustainable, legality is embedded in their discursive 
structures.   
A broader phenomenon is observable in the networking of legal professionals, who 
are ‘linked up’ by litigation in two ways.  Firstly, lawyers are linked into issue-specific 
networks within the discourse.  Regardless of what norms are relayed by judgment, the 
marshalling of discursive actors, issues and strategies for norm contest entails the 
dissemination of different legal expertise.  These network formations tend to be governed 
by a loose constellation of principles, strategies and causal beliefs ex ante, and thus prima 
facie have the greatest potential for development into sustainable hybrid formations.   
Litigation also links up discursive actors who would otherwise not have participated 
in the business and human rights discourse.  Of the various discursive actors forced to 
‘choose sides’ by normative iteration, corporate counsel, and the networks emanating from 
corporate legal departments are of special interest.  The dual prongs of risk mitigation—
short term and long—necessitate networking for the exchange of expertise between legal 
‘spheres’.  The ‘fragmentation’ of global law166 is thus actually riddled with dynamic 
iterations of substantive inter-connectivity,167 often as an explicit response to transnational 
litigation, by virtue of litigation’s exaggerated position as a site for interface and conflict 
between ‘separate spheres of law’.168    
                                                                                                                                                    
165  Steinhardt, supra note 15 at 193. 
166  The International Law Commission’s study on legal fragmentation is available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_9.htm#_ftn1.  
167  The link between substantive and institutional fragmentation is thoughtfully explored in Koch, 
Charles H., "Judicial Dialogue for Multiculturalism" 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 879 (2004). 
168  This dynamic is increasingly apparent in the services offered by international law firms.  Kinely 
notes Skadegard Thorsen Law Firm in Copenhagen,  Foley Hoag in Washington DC, and Baker McKenzie in 
London, as prominent firms that have incorporated the long and short term exigencies of CSR into advising 
 55 
 While the broader phenomenon of fragmentation has elicited a wide variety of 
responses,169 legal theorists attentive to the human rights paradigm have repeatedly turned 
their attention to the problematic role of international private law.  The esoteric domain of a 
“charmed circle of highly talented jurists,”170  the tendency of conflicts law to mask the 
exercise of power in enigmatic doctrine leads Baxi to call for the field’s ‘redemption’: 
 
[T]he inner dynamic of conflict of laws constitutes an obstacle to the promotion, 
protection and preservation of human rights.  But the mystery and mystique of 
private international law still remains beyond [the] praxiological grasp [of human 
rights activists]… It is small consolation for activist communities that these entities 
also mystify conflicts practitioners…171
 
Alternatively, Moran advocates interrogating the “fundamental challenge [such 
cases pose] to our traditional understanding of the legal system,” as emblematic.172   
According to this perspective, the private law struggles of human rights litigation are 
instrumental in focusing our attention on more fundamental developments in international 
law. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
services.  Mention might also be made of the ‘cottage industry’ that has sprung up about human rights 
corporate consultancy (van Schaack, supra note 25 at 128), especially to the degree that these firms are 
staffed predominantly by lawyers and promote their services as such (e.g., Multinational Monitors in New 
York). 
169  The Symposium entitled ‘Diversity or Cacophony: New Sources of Norms in International Law’ 
presents a wide array of perspectives, reprinted in the 4th issue of  Michigan Journal of International Law Vol 
25. 
170  Baxi, supra note 135 at 195. 
171  Ibid at 199. 
172  Moran, Mayo, "An Uncivil Action: the Tort of Torture and Cosmopolitan Private Law," in ibid in 
Scott (ed.), Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Human Rights 
Litigation. (Hart: Oxford, 2001) p 661, makes reference at 662 to Koh’s model, noting that  “…these cases 
are but the cutting edge of a much broader phenomenon.” 
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 The task of the advocate, the judge, and the law-maker no longer seems adequately 
captured—if it ever was—by the notion of discrete mutually exclusive spheres of 
binding law, conjoined through a set of rules premised on conflict and choice.  And 
indeed, what [transnational litigation] shows is a more subtle, yet distinct, move 
away from this model and towards a more multi-faceted integrative understanding 
of sources and a broader persuasive approach to authority.173
   
The instrumental role of litigation is important.  In providing a stage for “private 
international law in creatively attending to the regulation of transnational business 
conduct,”174 litigation also enacts “a kind of ‘jurisdictional interface’,”175 at which the 
controversies, overlaps, conflicts and accommodations of fragmentation are enacted and 
iterated along the networks connecting legal professionals.   Herein lies the most dynamic 
potential for the iterative function of litigation to embed legality in the business and human 
rights discourse.   
 
 If long-term networking strategies follow the iterative logic of specific litigation, 
then expertise sharing in response to the doctrinal challenges and conflict may indeed 
perform what systems theory terms the “mutual irritation” of autonomous regimes.     
 
Following the collapse of legal hierarchies, the only realistic option is to develop 
heterarchical forms of law that limit themselves to creating loose relationships 
between the fragments of law.  This might be achieved through a selective process 
of networking that normatively strengthens already existing factual networks 
between legal regimes: law-externally, the linkage of legal regimes with 
autonomous social sectors; and, law-internally, the linkage of legal regimes with 
one another.176
                                                 
173  Ibid at 683. 
174 Wai, supra note 90, at 274. 
175  Wai, supra note 35, at 484. 
176 Fischer-Lescano, supra note 111, at 1018. 
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This embeds legality in the business and human rights discourse by linking the 
discourse up with legal professionals and bodies of law prima facie external to it.  When 
such connections develop a self-reinforcing momentum, they constitute a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition for the construction of  
 
an effective pluralistic conception of regulatory governance that mixes international 
governmental treaties and institutions, state public laws, transnational non-
governmental organization and local private actors.177
                                                 
177  Wai, supra note 90, at 272. 
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6.3 What a Difference the Law Makes  
The articulative and iterative functions of litigation embed legality in discursive 
structures, affecting the foundation of constitutive rules, through the norms on which they 
are built, and the actors which do the building.  Accepting this argument, the question then 
becomes: what difference does this make for regulatory systems?   
 
Constitutive rules function as an interpretive framework, an “intricate network of 
tacit understandings and unwritten conventions, rooted in the soil of social interaction” and 
are common to all coordinated social activity.178  Brunnee and Toope discuss “patterns of 
interaction…against which any legal norm must be postulated and interpreted,” identifying  
 
a necessary step in distinguishing legal norms from other sociological norms…it is 
largely through the institutionally shaped rhetorical practices, and acceptance of 
reasoned argument, that law emerges from broader social practice.179
 
 While Kratochwil’s analysis suggests correspondence between embedded legality 
and ‘institutionally shaped rhetorical practices’, the communicative model clearly does not 
create positive law or hard legal systems.  It may be argued, however, that it is from 
precisely these ‘rhetorical practices’ that law derives its authority.   
 
…law is persuasive when…as a result of the existence of basic social 
understandings, it can call upon reasoned argument, particularly analogy, to justify 
                                                 
178  Postema, supra note73, at 361, 363-6. 
179  Brunnee, J. & Toope, S. J. "International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional 
Theory of International Law" 39 The Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 19 (2000) p 51. 
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 its processes and its broad substantive ends, thereby creating shared rhetorical 
knowledge [knowledge offered or created in dialogue, and employed in practical 
reasoning].180
 
The turn to interactive legal process for the persuasive force of rule systems is 
supported by a number of state-centric compliance theories of international law.  Koh’s 
transnational legal process model is one example.181    Another is offered by Thomas 
Franck’s examination of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘process validity’.182  Franck suggests that the 
‘compliance pull’ international norms exert on states may be determined by four indicators: 
determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence.183  Judicial articulation of 
complex norms may simultaneously contribute to the determinacy of rules and perform a 
ritual of symbolic validation.  Litigation’s validating function is strengthened by the 
expansive inclusivity of iteration, especially when corporate counsel is engaged in 
constructing the rules of the game, transcending the governing/governed dichotomy.184   
                                                 
180  Ibid at 72, 71. 
181  Supra note 31. 
182  Franck, Thomas M., The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990), a concise summation of the argument is offered at pp 48-9. 
183  Roughly and respectively: clarity and applicability to actual situations; institutions, rituals and 
processes that signal legitimacy; the paradigmatic harmony of rule systems; and the degree to which 
obligations are both perceived and observed by actors. 
184  This seems to be the preferable means for applying an interactive theory to international law, rather 
than reliance on the theoretically abstruse and semiotically loaded “internal morality” (see Brunnee & Toope 
supra note 178, pp 55-64.)  Koh is especially concerned with the direct correlation between process 
involvement and compliance, quipping, “as those of us who live in universities all know, the tactic that works 
best with a student who has a disciplinary problem is to put him or her on the school disciplinary committee.” 
Koh, Harold Hongju, "Jefferson Memorial Lecture: Transnational Legal Process After September 11th" 22 
Berkeley Journal of International Law 337 (2004b), at 338.  The validating institution of litigation remains 
prone to inter-national criticism, however, as long as it remains a predominantly American phenomenon.  
Accusations of judicial imperialism must be weighed against what Slaughter argues is the increasing trend 
towards jurisprudential cross-fertilization. 
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 Franck’s third and fourth indicators are both intimately tied up with notions of 
community that correspond well with this analysis’ understanding of constitutive rules.  As 
shared understandings about the norms and identities that delineate a discourse, constitutive 
rules operate in much in the same way as the “quest of states for coherence in the rules 
governing their conduct…not only assumes community, but is also evidence that states 
share the sense of membership in such a rule community.”185  Similarly, Franck approaches 
the adherence indicator from a Hartian perspective, arguing extant secondary rules of 
recognition.  These rules “define the source of all obligation, which derives from status in 
the community,”186 and this formalism allows the fairly commonsensical claim that the 
“degree to which a rule is obeyed affects the degree to which it is cognizable as a valid 
obligation.”187   Both coherence and adherence are accordingly epiphenomenal products of 
the shared understandings of socially constructed communities. 
If the articulative and iterative functions of litigation facilitate the construction of 
constitutive rules to coordinate polycentric regulatory systems, then this brief survey of 
Franck’s indicators suggests that they also contribute (directly and indirectly) to the 
legitimacy and compliance pull of those rule systems.  Thus, while embedding legality 
through litigation may not create law or legal systems for the global regulation of business 
and human rights, it does facilitate the construction and coherence of polycentric and 
hybrid regulation, and may embed in those systems the legitimacy and efficacy to which all 
law aspires. 
 
 This conclusion should not be confused with the claim that globalization has 
actually made hybrid systems more efficient regulatory tools per se, than the “state-
mediated inter-national world of arm’s-length economic transactions and traditional 
international legal mechanisms.”188  Indeed, empirical research indicates that legal, hybrid 
and private regulation all gain in efficacy and sustainability by virtue of the same intangible 
                                                 
185  Supra note 181 at 181. 
186  Ibid at 191, emphasis omitted. 
187   Ibid at 44. 
188  Ruggie, supra note 37 at 503, emphasis in original. 
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 resources of consensus and expertise.189  The argument here is that embedding legality is 
highly efficient and strategically advantageous method for fostering and employing those 
resources, and that domestic courts are uniquely positioned and equipped for this task.   
 It is worth noting, however, that all conclusions have thus far been drawn in the 
hypothetical.  This analysis will close by asserting the contingency of any such 
developments on the power, strategies and interactions manifest between empirically 
grounded actors. 
                                                 
189  Gordon, Kathryn, "Rules for the Global Economy: Synergies Between Voluntary and Binding 
Approaches" 1999 OECD Working Papers on International Investment (1999). 
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7 Contingency and Evolution 
7.1 Object Contingency—Exploiting a Nascent Phenomenon 
 There are a number of reasons why the communicative model highlights civil 
litigation in domestic courts.  While other ‘law declaring fora’ such as legal commissions, 
treaty bodies or legislators may exhibit similar articulative and iterative functions, litigatory 
procedures are unique in ensuring that multiple sides of an argument are taken into account, 
conducing cooperation and the foundation of constitutive rules.  The transparency ensured 
by legal reasoning and high profile cases is, moreover, often lacking in international 
processes.  Domestic courts are also capable of entertaining civil suits, and like 
international arbitrational fora, thereby function as ‘touchdown points’ of control for 
transnational business.  But unlike arbitrational fora, courts are linked through the state to 
an international public law matrix consisting in no small part of international human rights, 
environmental and criminal norms, and offer unique access to individuals otherwise unable 
to communicate with this ‘global norm structure’.  Accordingly, this type of litigation has 
been treated as the emblematic object of analysis, despite the fact that it is a strikingly 
limited and uncertain practice.   
 In the US, where transnational human rights litigation has been most prominent and 
successful, ATS cases proceed on uncertain footing after an equivocal ruling by the US 
Supreme Court190 and there are indications that the statute may be threatened by corporate 
                                                 
190  See supra note 110. 
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 lobby.191   The grand majority of cases have in any case been dismissed on procedural 
grounds, and the three settled to date stretched out for an average of 9 years each.  A 
handful of suits have been initiated in commonwealth countries, including Canada, 
Australia, India and the UK.  Unlike the ATS cases, which exercise statutory jurisdiction 
over a “violation of the law of nations,”192 these cases are based on common law principles 
of tort and negligence,193 and have been roundly curtailed by the forum non conveniens 
doctrine.194  Suits have also been brought in civil law jurisdictions such as Belgium and 
France through the Action Civile, which allows the combination of civil and criminal suits 
in a single action, though no precedence has been set.195  All in all, the instances of 
transnational civil litigation against corporations for human rights offenses are strikingly 
few, and not a single one has ever reached judgment on merits.   
 There is reason to believe, however, that future efforts may be more successful and 
widespread.  A recent interpretation of Brussels Convention Article 2196 by the 
                                                 
191  The first such major initiative was launched in the Senate last year and quickly withdrawn in the face 
of widespread criticism, see http://www.laborrights.org/projects/corporate/feinsteinupdate102505.htm.  It is 
unclear to what degree alternate statutes granting extra-territorial jurisdiction, such as RICO, ATVP and FSIA 
would fill the gap.  See Joseph, Sarah, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Oxford: 
Hart, 2004), supra, at 211. 
192  See supra note 24. 
193  Valid concerns have been raised about the characterization this implies.  See Woodlock J.’s opinion 
in Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (1995), arguing at 183 that this “…mutes the grave international law 
aspect of the tort, reducing it to no more (or less) than a garden-variety municipal tort.”  
194  This doctrine stays proceedings  if it is determined that another forum (often that in which the tort 
occurred) would be more appropriate.  To date no suits have proceeded beyond this point in European or 
Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
195  See Engle, Eric A., "Alien Torts in Europe?: Human Rights and Tort in European Law" Discussion 
paper 1/05 Center for European Legal Policy at the Universität Bremen, available at <http://www.zerp.uni-
bremen.de/english/pdf/dp1_2005.pdf> (2005), pp17-35, suggesting at 21 that homologous codes exists in 
“most civil law jurisdictions.” 
196  “Subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting State shall, 
whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State.”  Convention of 27 September 1968 on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.  
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 International Court of Justice197 seems to have placed a moratorium on forum non 
conveniens in civil suits against corporations domiciled or incorporated in European Union 
Member States.  A European Parliamentary resolution on the same Article “requests 
Member States to introduce such extraterritorial jurisdiction in their national 
legislation.”198  Simultaneously, forthcoming research indicates that incorporation of the 
Rome Statute has been inadvertently accompanied by extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction 
over corporate activity in a number of jurisdictions.199  This black letter law remains almost 
completely untested, and the degree to which criminalization entails implicit tort liability, 
is likely to be a point of considerable contention.   
 
 However future suits fare in relation to these developments will largely be a 
function of strategic and discursive contests between the same types of actors as those who 
litigate.  It is impossible to say whether the phenomenon will be stymied in its infancy by 
political and commercial pressures, or whether domestic courts will have the opportunity to 
contribute to larger normative and regulatory developments in the business and human 
rights discourse.  The first step towards a vision of transnational business regulation, 
however, and towards enabling the communicative function of litigation in its construction, 
is a theoretical and practical foray into the interaction of litigation with larger discourse 
structures.   
 This mandates not only research towards a broader perspective on human rights 
litigation, but efforts to promote, sustain and understand the practice across jurisdictions, 
and especially at the transnational register.  International human rights organizations would 
                                                 
197  Owusu (Judgments Convention/Enforcement of judgments), Advisory Opinion, EUECJ C-281/02 
(2005) 
198  Social Responsibility of Companies: Resolution of the European Parliament on the Green Book of 
the Commission. Resolution A5-0159 / 2002, 30 May 2002 (2002); for a discussion see Wouters, Jan, et al., 
"Tort Claims Against Multinational Companies for Foreign Human Rights Violations Committed Abroad: 
Lessons from the Alien Tort Claims Act?," in Slot & Bulterman (ed.), Globalisation and Jurisdiction. 
(Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2004), p 197. 
199   Business and International Crimes, 2nd Edition, FAFO (2006 (Forthcoming). This was the case for 
all 17 jurisdictions surveyed.  The results will be launched by the SRSG in Geneva, Sept 2006. 
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 do well to note the need for dissemination of best practices in, expertise on, and technical 
support for litigation and lobbying efforts in its stead.   It is then not such a far step from 
imagining litigation enabled and encouraged across jurisdictions, to domestic courts as a 
main driver for the development of business and human rights regulatory systems.   
7.2 Discourse Contingency—Betting on Legality 
 The communicative model of litigation and regulatory systems has suggested a 
broader argument regarding the role of legal language, institutions and processes in non-
legal or hybrid regulation.  Embedding legality is presumed to be a good thing, facilitating 
consensus and regulatory legitimacy.  But here too, development is thoroughly contingent 
on the strategic interactions, negotiations and power struggles waged by discursive actors.  
Fanciful invocations of a “global rule of law”200 suffer harsh temperance at the couplet of 
legality and moral legitimacy,201 and Cutler’s admonitions regarding “the juridification of 
commerce…to substantiate and legitimate [private] claims to [global] political authority,” 
merit serious consideration.   
 This problematique may be summarized by the mimetic characteristics of 
pervasivity and permeability.  Embedded legality is pervasive because clarity and authority 
lend momentum to relay, such that legally embedded norms penetrate and exert influence 
on a variety of foreign discursive structures.  Embedded legality is permeable to the extent 
that legal norms and reasoning are manipulable by powerful discursive actors.  Both these 
characteristics are well illustrated by the legal ‘duty of care’ as articulated by English 
courts. 
 
In the late 1990’s, over 3,000 South Africans filed suit against the English based 
corporation, Cape plc.  Cape subsidiaries had operated asbestos mines in South Africa, 
                                                 
200  Supra note 37. 
201  Legal slavery is the quintessential illustration. 
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 whose operations allegedly induced injuries and death in the surrounding communities.  
Brought on common law tort principles of negligence, the case alleged fault with decision 
makers in the UK where the parent company was based.202  A duty of care based on 
negligence doctrine thus entails a clear positive duty  
 
to protect others from damage …if the actor creates or controls a dangerous 
situation, or when there is a special relationship between parties or when the 
seriousness of the harm on the one side and the ease of avoiding the damage on the 
other side points towards a duty…203
 
This formulation recalls the ‘spheres of influence’ concept of the business and 
human rights discourse, which entails gradient human rights responsibilities for 
corporations across concentric boundaries of geography and subsidiarity.  Like 
‘complicity’, the ‘spheres of influence’ concept may be thought to already base a 
constitutive rule, while the content and scope of the concept remain hotly contested.204  
While it is certainly correct to say that the concept “has no legal pedigree,”205 there remains 
a powerful influence to be had by legal norms, reasoning and processes on its development.    
The first court of appeal in Cape described a possible a legal ‘duty of care’ owed by 
parent corporations to those affected by the operations of subsidiaries.206  In denying a 
                                                 
202  This is crucially distinct from attributing parent liability for the fault of a subsidiary; i.e., corporate 
veil piercing. 
203  European Group on Tort Law , Principles of European Tort Law (2005), Art 4:103, 
www.egtl.org/principles/index.htm  
204  Article 1 of the UN Norms states that  “Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment 
of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights,”  and clarification of the concept constituted an 
integral part of the SRSG’s mandate, supra note 21. 
205  Ruggie, supra note 5 par 67. 
206  "Whether a parent company which is proved to exercise de facto control over the operations of a 
(foreign) subsidiary and which knows, through its directors, that those operations involve risks to the health 
of workers employed by the subsidiary and/or persons in the vicinity of its factory or other business premises, 
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 forum non conveniens motion to dismiss, Justice Evans endorsed the existence of that duty 
of care as  
 
an issue of law which can be decided in either South Africa or England, although 
prima facie the allegation of a common law duty of care owed by an English 
defendant, albeit to a class of persons situated overseas, should more appropriately 
be decided by the English Courts.207
 
 A second appeal based on forum non conveniens was also denied, and the suit 
settled shortly thereafter.  No analogous litigation has been initiated in English courts since 
the Cape settlement, but following the ICJ’s ruling on forum non conveniens, it seems 
reasonable to assume that future litigation (provided the corporation is domiciled in the 
UK) will proceed with relative ease to deliberations over the duty of care.    
The argumentative form these deliberations will take are fairly clear: common law 
negligence principles dictate the ‘neighbor test’, which balances the foreseeability of 
injury, proximity between the parties, and when it is reasonable to impose the duty.208  
While the first two elements are predominantly fact-based, the third is prone to the 
influence of corporate practice.  “In both civil and regulatory cases, conformance to 
industry custom is usually strong evidence of reasonableness unless the custom itself is 
unreasonable or the defendant’s particular circumstances require more.”209  The 
proliferation of corporate codes of conduct and voluntary initiatives are especially relevant 
                                                                                                                                                    
owes a duty of care to those workers and/or other persons in relation to the control which it exercises over and 
the advice which it gives to the subsidiary company?" Lubbe & Ors v Cape Plc, EWCA Civ 1351 Not 
Reported (1988) 
207  Ibid. 
208  Cane, Peter, The Anatomy of Tort Law (Oxford: Hart, 1997), p 125. 
209  Wood, Stepan, "Green Revolution or Greenwash? Voluntary Environmental Standards, Public Law, 
and Private Authority in Canada," in Canada (ed.), New Perspectives on the Public–Private Divide. 
(Vancouver: UCB Press, 2003a) at note 73. 
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 here, and one is tempted to look towards the actions of market leaders, such as BP,210 to 
establish higher standards of behavior for transnational business. 
 
The more powerful the market actor the more likely it is to generate the generally 
accepted commercial customs of that market, perhaps to go further and to enshrine 
those customs into standard form contracts, and, at the highest level of influence, to 
persuade courts and legislatures to give official legal sanction to those customs 
through recognition in case law and/or codification through statute.211
 
 Wood discusses the relationship between single corporations’ Environmental 
Management Systems (EMS) and ‘industry practice’ as cognized by public regulators, 
noting that “[p]ublic authorities, including legislatures, regulators and courts, are 
implicated in complicated ways in the establishment, shaping and operation of private 
authority.”212  This indicates a subtle reflexivity between market practice, judicial doctrine, 
and state and private regulatory mechanisms, that is intricately nuanced but well suited to 
analysis in articulative and iterative terms.  Positing the centrality of litigation and legalism 
does not, however, lead directly to the conclusion that ‘best practices’ of business leaders 
will be decisive.  Any signs of judicial expansion on the duty of care, and certainly the 
unthinkable ‘judgment before settlement’, would have serious repercussions in the market, 
likely including widespread subsidiarity restructuring to mitigate liability.   
 Disengagement of parent companies from subsidiary operations has very real 
consequences, not only for what is considered ‘reasonable’ behavior in specific 
adjudications, but for the enjoyment and protection of human rights vis-à-vis small 
subsidiary operations and the real people affected by them.   Corporate counsel advice on 
                                                 
210  Supra note 148. 
211  Muchlinski, Peter, "Global Bukowina Examined: Viewing the Multinational Enterprise as a 
Transnational Law-making Community," in Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a State. (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1997), p. 80. 
212  Wood, Stepan , "Environmental Management Systems and Public Authority in Canada: Rethinking 
Environmental Governance" 10 Buffalo Environmental Journal 129 (2003b), pp 184-7, 131. 
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 EMS design offers a pithy summation, “the best way to ensure that the liability…stays 
where it belongs is to…keep corporate parents out of areas where they just don't 
belong.”213  This is in a sense an extension of Shamir’s observation that litigation forces 
corporations “into a strategy of downplaying their ability to have a substantial impact upon 
their immediate social and physical environment, thereby implying a sort of diminished 
capacity to act responsibly in a proactive way.”214   
 Of course, these two prognoses are stylized simplifications.  Whichever the actual 
developments most resemble will be the result of innumerable struggles and negotiations, 
protracted and waged in many fora.  The question of which interests are in the end served 
by the globalization of law or the legalization of international politics, is in the end a 
question of power, chance and strategic mobilization.  In the business and human rights 
discourse it is as much as anything about agreeing on constitutive rules, and about whom it 
is that plays the game.   
7.3 Conclusions from a Human Rights Perspective 
 This analysis has argued that:  (1) Any global regulatory system for business and 
human rights will likely be of a hybrid and polycentric nature.  (2)  The cooperative 
structures upon which any such regulatory system will be built are productively theorized 
as constitutive rules in a discourse.  (3)  The argumentative rationality institutionalized by 
judicial proceedings facilitates the foundation of constitutive rules, while the attendant 
authority and clarity of judicial reasoning promotes courts as a privileged forum for 
negotiation and contest over the substance of those rules.  (4)   Through the articulation of 
                                                 
213  Bergeson, Lynn, Legal Lookout: When a Parent's Involvement May Be Too Much, Pollution 
Engineering, 1 April 2005 available at <http://www.lawbc.com/articles.shtml>.  Of course, this comment 
responds to liabilities already developed  in litigation (specifically United States vs. Bestfoods, 524 US 51 
(1998)), namely the direct and the indirect liability of veil piercing, and not a duty of care, for which  
distancing strategies would be significantly more complicated. 
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 complex norms and the iteration of network pathways, transnational human rights litigation 
embeds legality in discursive structures, and potentially in constitutive rules.  (5)  The 
embedding of legality does not equate regulation with law, but is likely to match law’s 
legitimacy in the development of regulatory systems.  (6) The evolution of discourse 
structures and the development of regulatory systems are thoroughly contingent on the 
mobilization and contest of discursive strategies and power struggles between empirically 
motivated actors.   
These six points cohere into what has been termed the ‘communicative model’ of 
litigation in the business and human rights discourse.  The communicative model represents 
a novel theoretical amalgamation, as well as a more comprehensive speculation on 
litigation’s long term consequences than is generally offered in academic analyses.  It is 
perhaps most importantly characterized as an alternative perspective, opportune at a time of 
apparent impasse in one of the most contentious and dynamic international policy issues of 
the turning century.   In this respect, the communicative model suggests two, more general 
arguments, each of particular salience for the international human rights agenda.     
 Firstly, the contributions of domestic courts to the human rights regulation of 
corporate activity exceed that of immediate restitution or deterrence.  While courts may 
indeed offer “a ‘stick’ that, in appropriate but extraordinary circumstances, reinforces the 
‘carrot’ of the marketplace,”215  a more profitable description is one of inter-action and 
mutual influence rather than reinforcement.  This suggests the need for a deeper 
understanding of transnational human rights litigation vis-à-vis global business regulation, 
from theoretical, as well as practical perspectives.   
 Secondly, in the absence of ‘hard’ legal solutions, there remains a fundamental and 
formative role to be played by legal language, actors and institutions in non-legal or hybrid 
regulatory mechanisms.  Exploring this role might provide the human rights movement 
with its most felicitous modality for moving ‘beyond voluntarism’. 
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215  Steinhardt, supra note 15 at 202. 
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 These two arguments are more provocative than they are conclusive, offering little 
in the way of concrete strategies, the authoritative analyses or policy recommendations 
with which human rights scholarship is prone to conclude.  The general contingencies 
discussed earlier in this chapter are, moreover, compounded by principled resistance to 
litigation within the human rights community.  Some have voiced concern that litigation’s 
“emphasis on those rights that are deemed justiciable has the potential to influence, and 
potentially distort, the normative development of the international human rights corpus.”216  
Others worry that punishing corporations for involvement with oppressive regimes 
neutralizes their potential to positively impact the human rights situation in weak states,217 
or that civil litigation “commodifies the basic principles of human dignity and thus 
surrenders the moral high ground.”218  The communicative model does not directly address 
these concerns, valid as they are, but complicates them by forcing a more macro 
perspective.   
 This analysis has continually gestured towards broader contexts—setting litigation 
within a discourse, setting the powerful rise of transnational corporations within the 
elaborate legal framework of a global economy.  To analyze the business and human rights 
discourse against the deeper structures of globalized commerce, is to locate that discourse 
within a process of juridification from which it is largely excluded.  The explosive 
‘fragmentation’ of legal instruments, frameworks and arbitrational fora which facilitate 
global commerce proceeds as independent of international human rights law as it is 
indifferent to that law’s sanctity and efficacy.  Yet the business and human rights discourse 
enjoys no comparable autonomy.  The elaborate legal framework supporting global 
commerce has de facto access to business regulation, and commercial law topoi are 
assumed to be naturally germane to human rights discourse.  That human rights norms 
meanwhile lack any standing in the discourses of international commercial law suggests the 
image of a discursive Bantustan where borders are porous for only one class of discursive 
                                                 
216  van Schaack, supra note 25 at 2336. 
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218  Steinhardt, supra note 15 at 221. 
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 actor.  Though the metaphor is facetious, the point is material.  It is a matter of history and 
a question of power. 
 Embedding legality in the business and human rights discourse represents an 
organic means—perhaps the only means—of linking these processes of commercial 
juridification up with human rights norms.  It is also a means of subjecting regulatory 
design within the business and human rights discourse to human rights law, a potentially 
crucial reinforcement given the unequal footing shared by human rights norms and 
investment law, trade law, contract law, and the rest.  The practical and substantive divides 
separating these bodies of law from the human rights regime remain chasmic, but by 
spanning them through the iteration of discursive structures, along which human rights 
norms circulate and regulatory structures for business can be constructed, human rights law 
might just be granted access to these negotiations.   
Questions about consequences for the human rights corpus or the behavior of 
individual states reveal themselves as strategic issues against this broader dynamic context, 
not the principled issues they first appear to be.  The real question is whether human rights 
law will play the game.  Not surprisingly, this analysis suggests that whether or not human 
rights law plays the game has concrete consequences for how the game is played.  The 
types of legal norms and topoi employed in international norm contest have profound 
impact, as do the institutional and legal auspices under which such contest takes plays.  A 
notorious example is offered by the TRIPS negotiations, shifted from UNICEF, where 
‘knowledge is the common heritage of mankind’, to the WTO, where knowledge is a 
commodity. 
 In this respect, the most important contribution to be made by human rights law 
may very well be its foundation on individual human dignity as the ultimate qualifier of 
substantive and procedural legitimacy.219  Human rights are distinct as an international 
legal regime in this regard, and entail a wealth of jurisprudential guidance on how this 
principled difference is to be operationalized in legal standards and procedures.  To 
quarantine this jurisprudence from the development of regulatory systems, or the processes 
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 of juridification taking place in the global market more generally, is to hobble the evolution 
of a just global order.   
 
 Emerging from an epoch of standard setting and codification, to construct 
mechanisms of implementation in the age of globalization, the human rights movement is 
confronted by a very different international landscape than that against which it originated, 
and reveals itself as “not at all well constructed in order to enable it to adapt, let alone 
transform itself to new challenges.”220   But ‘command and control’ tropes simply do not 
do the trick when “both the form and content of regulation are themselves an instrument of 
economic competition,”221  and a more nuanced understanding of human rights in the 
global political economy is required if human dignity is to penetrate market structures and 
the networks of global power in the 21st century.  In the final analysis, it is towards this 
larger end that the current model aspires to make a small contribution.   
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